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INTRODUCTION
The Bible records a lawyer's encounter with Jesus. I paraphrase: the
lawyer stands up in a crowd and asks, "How do I get to heaven?" Jesus re-
sponds in law-professor fashion, "What does the law say? What's your take?"
"Well, the law says love God and love your neighbor," the lawyer says. "Bin-
go!" Jesus replies. Discontent with the vagueness of the law, the lawyer
presses, "Sure, but who is my neighbor?" The lawyer then slumps back into his
seat as Jesus-still in law-professor persona-descends into parable, keeping
his answer partially obscured.'
Like ancient Hebrew law, our modern law was raised on a steady diet of
legal vagaries, and we law-types find ourselves asking the same sorts of ques-
tions: The "public interest?" Who is the "public?" My city? My country?
Aren't some interests more important than others? What about conflicting in-
terests? Vague laws generate questions, but perhaps nowhere do these questions
carry greater importance than in electricity regulation.
Regulators of the electricity industry receive their authority from sta-
tutes saturated with notions of the "public interest." In various contexts, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must ensure that utilities' ac-
tions are "just and reasonable," 2 "consistent with the public interest,"3 "compat-
ible with the public interest,"4 and "in the public interest."s Indeed, the whole
reason for federal involvement in power regulation is quite explicitly the "public
interest."6  Likewise, state public utilities commissions (PUCs) must grapple
with, inter alia, the "public convenience and necessity,"7 "the interest and aid of
public health, security, convenience, and general welfare,"8 "enhance[ment] of
socioeconomic fabric,"9 "[ust and reasonable],"'o and "any other issue the
[PUC] chooses to consider.""
I Luke 10:25-37.
2 16 U.S.C.A. § 824e(a) (2010) (ratemaking).
3 Id. at § 824p(b)(3) (2010) (transmission permitting); Id. at § 824b(a) (purchases and leases
of generation facilities, and mergers and acquisitions).
4 Id. at § 824c(a) (issuing securities).
5 Id. at § 824i(c)(1) (transmission interconnections).
6 Id at § 824(a) ("It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric ener-
gy ... is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation of [power generation and
transmission] is necessary in the public interest . . . .").
7 E.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 278.020(1) (West 2010) (facility siting).
8 E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 202 (West 2010) (rulemaking policy).
9 E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-98-11 (b)(3) (2010) (facility siting).
10 E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-4-115 (2010) (ratemaking).
" E.g., OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 757.212(7)(d) (West 2010) (resource planning).
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Statutory commands like these caused an irritated Judge Friendly to re-
mark,
The statutes from which [agencies] derive their authority are so
often couched in such broad general terms as to endow them
with a discretion so wide that they can offer a more or less
plausible explanation for any conclusion they choose to
reach.... Sometimes telling the agency to do what is in the
public interest is the practical equivalent of instructing it: "Here
is the problem. Deal with it."' 2
Not much has changed. The world in which electric utilities operate,
however, is changing rapidly. As the global recession reached its apex last year,
electricity consumption sank 0.9% to twenty billion megawatts. 13 This was the
first decline in consumption since at least 1971,14 and still roughly 25% above
2000 levels.' 5 The Energy Information Administration projects an 87% increase
in electricity consumption from 2007-2035.16
The effects of fossil fuel-based power generation on the climate are well
documented. An unremarkable 7 1,000 megawatt base-load coal plant typically
combusts close to 24,000 tons of coal every day,' 8 emitting 36,000 to 84,000
tons of carbon dioxide (CO2).'9 Using recent climate change figures from the
U.S. Department of Energy, that coal-fired plant causes $0.76-$1.76 million of
12 HENRY FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 12 (1962) (quoting STAFF REP.
OF H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE 6 (1961) and KENNETH DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.03 at 82).
13 Electricity, BP.COM, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010,
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryld=9023768&contentld=7044479 (last vi-
sited Mar. 1, 2011) (North America produces 25% of the world total).
14 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, 2010 KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 26 (2010), available at
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2010/key stats 20 10.pdf.
Is BP.COM, supra note 13.
16 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 2010 INT'L ENERGY OUTLOOK 77-95 (2010), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieolpdf/0484(2010).pdf.
1 Coal plants commonly exceed 2,000 megawatt capacity and some exceed 3,000 megawatts.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EXISTING GENERATING UNITS IN THE UNITED STATES BY STATE,
COMPANY, AND PLANT, 2008 (2009), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/capacity/existingunitesbs2008.xls.
I8 See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED CONSEQUENCES OF
ENERGY PRODUCTION AND USE 3 (2009) (assuming one ton of coal produces one MWh of electric-
ity for purposes of environmental damage calculations).
19 Geoffrey M. Heal, Reflections-The Economics ofRenewable Energy in the United States, 4
REV. ENvTL. EcoN. & POL'Y 139, 140 (2010) (every ton of combusted coal combines with oxygen
to produce 1.5 to 3.5 tons of C0 2, depending on carbon content); see U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
CARBON DIOxIDE EMISSION FACTORS FOR COAL (1994), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/quarterly/co2_article/co2.html (describing factors in determin-
ing carbon content and energy density of different coal types).
2011] 741
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exclusively climate-related damages every day.20 Using climate figures from
the British Department of Energy and Climate Change, those damage projec-
tions rise to $2.99-$6.97 million per day.21 Natural gas-fired power produces
roughly half the climate-related damages of coal.22 Particulate matter (PM),
sulfur dioxide (SO 2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and heavy metal emissions-
mostly from coal-also pose serious dangers to public health and the environ-
ment.23 A congressionally-commissioned study by the National Research
Council monetized the damage from S02, NOx, and PM from coal and natural
gas production. Each coal-fired megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity caused, on
average, $32 of damage to human health, grain crop and timber yields, building
24materials, recreation, and visibility of outdoor vistas. Many coal plants studied
caused upwards of $120/MWh. 25 Natural gas is better, producing an average of
$1.60/MWh up to $10/MWh in damage. Fossil fuel plants' voracious water
demand could lead to billions of dollars in water shortage-related damages.26
The extraction processes required to unearth coal, oil, gas, and uranium cost
human lives, injury, illness, and acute environmental disasters-as the Deepwa-
ter Horizon oil spill poignantly reminds us. 2 7 The effects of transmission line
20 See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FINAL RULE TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT (TSD): ENERGY
EFFICIENCY PROGRAM FOR COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT: SMALL ELECTRIC MOTORS
Appendix 15A (2010) (climate damages equal to $21/ton CO 2 today, rising to $45/ton CO 2 by
2050), available at
http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance-standards/commercial/semfinalrule tsd.html.
21 See U.K. DEP'T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, CARBON APPRAISAL IN UK POLICY
APPRAISAL: A REVISED APPROACH (2009), available at
http://www.renewableseast.org.uk/uploads/Carbon%20Appraisal%20in%2UK%2OPolicy%20ap
praisal%20revised%20approach.pdf (at exchange rate of 1.00 = $1.625, climate damages equal
$83/MWh of coal).
22 NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 3-7.
23 Particulate matter is a source of heart and lung disease, asthma, and haze; SO2 forms sulfur-
ic acid in the atmosphere that destroys vegetation and destabilizes water pH balances as acid rain;
NOx causes smog and combines with SO 2 to form acid rain; emitted mercury and lead concentrate
up the food chain and cause human developmental problems. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL.,
ENERGY, ECONOMICS & THE ENVIRONMENT 252-58 (2d ed. 2006); see generally VACLAV SMIL,
ENERGY AT THE CROSSROADS 105-16 (2003).
24 NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 3-4, 6-8.
25 Id.
26 Benjamin K. Sovacool & Kelly E. Sovacool, Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis
Areas in the United States, 34 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 333, 367-68 (2009).
27 The April 20, 2010 explosion on the Deepwater Horizon platform killed 11, injured 17, and
the oil discharge is among the largest spills in world history as well over 100 million gallons of
crude have created an oil slick of at least 2,500 square miles-as of this writing. See Ray Henry,
Scientists Up Estimate ofLeaking GulfOil, Associated Press (June 15, 2010, 10:06 PM), available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37717335/ns/disaster in the_ gulf/. Gas and oil extraction
processes often inject diesel oil (containing benzene) or other drilling fluids down drill shafts,
release radioactive pollutants (radium-226 and radium-228), and discharge a grease and water
mixture and drill cuttings into land and water environments. See BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v.
EPA, 66 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 1995) (describing in detail the various discharges of offshore oil and
742 [Vol. 113
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construction and operation have received far less scrutiny, but are not insignifi-
cant: the United States now has roughly 160,000 miles of rural high-voltage
lines that commonly require 200 plus foot-wide deforested easements. 28 Elec-
tricity production and transmission degrades ecosystems and their services, 29
which were valued in 1997 at $33 billion globally.30 The industry likewise di-
minishes notoriously difficult to quantify "nonuse values."31 Steadily increasing
consumption of fossil fuel for electricity, therefore, is adding pressure to an al-
ready strained environment. 32
Utility regulators' treatment of the environment-and the courts' post-
ure toward that treatment-is now more important than ever. Utility regulators
must act rationally when executing their statutory "public interest" duties.
Equally important, courts must reevaluate their understanding of what consti-
tutes rational decision-making in modem utility regulation. They should ask,
gas exploration and extraction, and EPA's attempts to regulate those discharges); David Vearrier
et al., Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials, 47 CLINICAL
ToXICOLOGY 393, 393-406 (2009) (finding that workers in certain industries, including fossil fuel
extraction and combustion, face increased risk of exposure to exceptionally potent "ionizing radia-
tion"); Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells' Tainted Water Hits Rivers, NEW YORK TIMES,
Al (Feb. 27, 2011).
28 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TRANSMISSION FACT SHEET (2003), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/fact-sheets/transmission.html; see, e.g., Route
Permit Application by Great River Energy, 2010 WL 1677143 (Minn. P.U.C. April 22, 2010)
(approving transmission project's 1.25 mile-wide route); Andy Stone, An Interstate Highway
System for Energy, 182 FORBES 108, 108 (Nov. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/1124/108.html.
29 The United States Department of Agriculture has defined ecosystem services as including
"primary services" like nutrient cycling and soil formation; "provisioning services" like food,
fiber, and pharmaceuticals; "regulating services" like pollination, water and air purification, flood
and erosion prevention, and pest and disease regulation; and "cultural services" like recreation,
ecotourism, and aesthetic and religious values. SALLY COLLINS & ELIZABETH LARRY, U.S. DEP'T
OF AGRICULTURE, CARING FOR OUR NATURAL ASSETS: AN ECOSYSTEM SERVICES PERSPECTIVE 5
(2007), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/ecosystemservices/pdf/collinslarry.pdf.
30 Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital,
387 NATURE 253, 253-60 (1997) ($33 trillion valuation based on 1997 dollar); but see Nancy
Bockstael et al., On Measuring Economic Values for Nature, 34 ENVTL. SCIENCE & TECH. 1384,
1384-89 (2000) (explaining that measures of global willingness-to-pay to prevent complete loss
of ecosystem services are specious and unrealistic as real world tradeoffs occur at points between
complete loss and complete preservation, and therefore marginal willingness-to-pay is a more
useful measure of eco-service value).
3 Nonuse value is the gain in a person's utility without actually "using" a good, like environ-
mental quality. This encompasses the "existence" value of knowing the good exists, "altruistic"
value of knowing someone else is enjoying the good, and "bequest" value of knowing that future
generations may enjoy the good. CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, ENVIRONMENTAL EcoNoMics 296
(2000).
32 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2009 31, Table 3.1 (2011), available
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epalepa.pdf; see generally VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY AT
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"Is decision-making that marginalizes environmental impacts rational?" This
article highlights the inextricable tangles between environmental impacts and
"public interest" duties, and concludes that utility regulators can make sensible
decisions only by integrating environmental analysis into "public interest" anal-
ysis-or by dumb luck. The primary insight of this article, therefore, is that
utility regulators cannot fulfill their statutory "public interest" duties without
addressing environmental impacts. Although not identical, the two concepts are
inseparable. As a result, judges ought to remand for further consideration any
decisions that purport to execute "public interest" duties, but fail to weigh envi-
ronmental impacts.
Part I of this article samples the authority and activities of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and state public utilities commissions to deci-
pher how, as a practical matter, utility regulators interpret the "public interest."
Most modem "public interest" language, it turns out, boils down to three interre-
lated principles: (1) cost-minimization, (2) nondiscrimination, and (3) service
adequacy. When determining consistency with this conception of the "public
interest," many utility regulators systematically exclude or marginalize envi-
ronmental concerns.
Part II explores the implications of a bedrock administrative law doc-
trine that requires agency actions to arise from thoughtful decision-making
processes. Assuming the three principles articulated in Part I are reasonable
interpretations of "public interest" language, regulators must still take a hard
look at all material facts and issues. In other words, even if a regulator's deci-
sion-making outcome appears reasonably related to its enabling statute, the re-
viewing judge must nonetheless see that the outcome was a product of a cohe-
rent and rational decision-making process. If the environment, therefore, is
material to cost-minimization, nondiscrimination, or service quality-or any
other statutory obligation, for that matter-then the so called "hard look" doc-
trine demands scrupulous environmental consideration. In most cases, the envi-
ronment is indeed a salient component of "public interest" goals, and deserves
hard look scrutiny.
Part III describes a variety of scenarios where utility regulators might
sensibly ignore the environment in executing their "public interest" duties.
Such situations could arise under de minimis environmental risks, great scientif-
ic uncertainty, environmental costs that are accounted for elsewhere, other statu-
tory obligations requiring regulators to consider environmental impacts, or a
tenuous connection between particular impacts and statutory "public interest"
duties.
I. How UTILITY REGULATORS INTERPRET "PUBLIC INTEREST"
Regulation in the name of "public interest" is nearly as old as law itself.
Historians have traced the genesis of public interest regulation to a handful of
[Vol. 113744
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beginnings. Roman emperor, Diocletian, fixed maximum prices for 800 differ-
ent goods under the guise of the "just price" doctrine. The doctrine recognized
the heightened potential for coercion amid conditions of lopsided bargaining
power, as might occur with supply shocks (e.g. a sudden famine) or resource
monopolies.3 4 "Just price" restrained prices to reflect production costs, regard-
less of market equilibria. Other scholars look to the medieval guild system as
the forerunner of regulation in the name of the "public interest."36 Governmen-
tal bodies recognized, protected, and regulated monopolies held by trade guilds.
Those guilds, in exchange for government restrictions on market entry, agreed
to deliver adequate service to all customers at "reasonable" prices. Thus the
public's interest in particular goods and services gave rise to an implied contract
between regulator and regulated.
Ancient roots slowly gave rise to common law doctrines laying out spe-
cific rights and obligations of "common callings."38 These businesses "affected
with a public interest" were constrained by courts from encroaching upon a
handful of closely guarded interests. Courts required public businesses to pro-
vide (1) adequate (2) nondiscriminatory service (3) at reasonable rates.
The Reconstruction era Supreme Court invoked a dusty treatise written
by Lord Chief Justice Hale to link common law and economic conceptions of
the "public interest" :40
[In the case of monopoly] there cannot be taken arbitrary and
excessive duties for carnage, wharfage, pesage, etc., neither can
they be enhanced to an immoderate rate, but the duties must be
reasonable and moderate, though settled by the king's license or
charter. For now the wharf and crane and other conveniences
are affected with a public interest, and they cease to be juris
privati only; as if a man set out a street in a new building on his
33 BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION 243-44 (1980) (citing
MARTIN G. GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1957)).
34 MICHAEL A. CREW & PAUL R. KLEINDORFER, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION 27 (1986).
3s MITNICK, supra note 33, at 243-44 (1980).
36 Id. at 244-45.
3 For more on the "bargaining theory" account of regulation, see JIM RossI, REGULATORY
BARGAINING & PUBLIC LAW (2005).
38 MITNICK, supra note 33, at 246.
3 See FORD P. HALL, THE CONCEPT OF A BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST 13-16,
56-62 (1940). "Reasonable" rates later acquired an economic efficiency hue, but at common law
it was closer to the "just price" doctrine, meaning simply that prices must not exceed what con-
sumers would expect to see under ordinary circumstances. See CREW & KLENDORFER, supra note
34, at 27-28.
4 See HALL, supra note 39, at 13-16.
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own land, it is now a no longer bare private interest, but is af-
fected by a public interest.41
Modem economic accounts of utility regulation feature the public's in-
terest in social efficiency.4 2 Consumer protection goals are corollary to achiev-
ing optimal, or, in the case of natural monopoly, "second best" market condi-
tions.43 The goal is to maximize welfare gains for all, including producer profits
and consumer "profits" (i.e. willingness-to-pay above price actually paid).
Barry Mitnick laments that "there remains no accepted definition of the
['public interest'], much less an accepted operational definition offering indica-
tors that we may use to determine empirically whether something is in the pub-
lic interest."" Although many scholars argue that regulation does not arise and
operate in pure magnanimity, 45 none seriously dispute that the "public interest"
concept remains the dominant normative rationale for regulation, and indeed
permeates the formal statutory duties of regulators. In utility regulation today,
agency and judicial interpretations of statutory "public interest" mandates are
colored by ancient "just price" doctrine, common law duties, and economic effi-
ciency.
The organic statutes that breathe life into electricity regulating agencies
wax heavy on "public interest" language, leaving most details to agency discre-
tion. Details, especially environmental details, are rare birds in utility regula-
tion.4 6 Without further statutory guidance, agencies are forced to make choices
regarding the content of the "public interest." And for the most part these
choices show little concern for environmental consequences.
41 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1872) (quoting Lord Hale, De Portibus Maris, Hargrave
Law Tracts, 78).
42 CREw & KLEINDORFER, supra note 34, at 10.
43 "Optimal" conditions exist in competitive markets where the price of a good equals its mar-
ginal cost of production. If fixed costs are large and marginal cost of production is roughly level
or declining, as in the provision of utility services, regulators cannot fix prices at marginal cost
without endangering the financial viability of the firm. Revenues compensate only variable costs
and leave negative profits equal to fixed costs. A "second best" condition exists where price is set
at average cost-the lowest price consistent with positive or at least non-negative profits. See
Luis CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 75-78 (2000).
4 MITNICK, supra note 33, at 259.
45 Public choice theorists, led by George Stigler, emphasize regulators' drive toward self-
preservation and expansion, and portray regulation as mere propitiation of powerful regulated
firms. Regulators are thus "captured" by special interests, and "public interested" regulation is a
practical myth. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF
EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
4 For discussion on the importance of "public interest" language in the presence of statutory
detail regarding environmental consideration, see infra Part III.D.
746 [Vol. 113
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A. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
1. Ratemaking
The bread and butter authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) is ratemaking. The duty to ensure that all interstate transmis-
sion and wholesale power rates are "just and reasonable" extends to any "rule,
regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rates."a FERC entertains com-
plaints and brings motions of its own to enforce just and reasonable rates. 4 8
When a "rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract" is
found "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential," FERC may
order a refund to the ratepayer for the difference between what was paid and
what would have been paid under a just and reasonable rate system.4 9 The Su-
preme Court has said that this authority must be read in light of the Federal
Power Act's core purpose to protect "the public interest."50 Indeed, when a rate
adversely affects the "public interest" it is not "just and reasonable,"5 and when
it is "unduly discriminatory" it is not in the "public interest."52
Prior to 1996, the dominant rate form was based on the cost of service.
Cost-of-service rates provided for reasonable return on all prudent and useful
investments. Regulators spread the utility's total revenue requirement across
different customer classes. The total requirement was equal to [variable costs] +
[rate of return x rate base].53 In other words, the utility's total revenue require-
ment was equal to the costs of doing business plus a reasonable profit. In rate
hearings, the parties scrupulously unpeeled the sticky distinction between rea-
sonable and unreasonable fuel costs, employee salaries, capital depreciation, and
which capital resources were useful enough and acquired prudently enough to
form a component of a "just and reasonable" rate.5 4
47 16 U.S.C.A. § 824e(a) (2010).
48 Id.
49 Id. at § 824e(b).
so Fed. Power Comm'n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956) (noting that a rate
may be so low as to be "unjust and unreasonable" because it has "an adverse effect on the public
interest").
51 16 U.S.C.A. § 824e(a) (2010).
52 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 27 (2002) ("Upon a finding of undue discrimination,
'[FERC] shall determine the just and reasonable ... regulation, practice, or contract ... and shall
fix the same by order."' (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a))).
5 DAVID MUCHOw & WILLIAM MOGEL, ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS § 2.07 (2010).
54 See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679, 693 (1923) ("The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
soundess of the utility and should be adequate .. . to maintain and support its credit and enable it
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In 1996, FERC turned wholesale ratemaking upside-down by issuing
Order 888, which required transmission line owners to offer transmission access
to all customers on the same terms and conditions as they use their own lines.ss
Order 888 did not speak directly to rates, but with an open-access transmission
system, it laid the cornerstone for market competition at the power generation
level. Market-based rates flourished. A seldom used rate policy-any rate
goes, so long as market power is lacking-became the industry's mainstay.
As the market reach of power generators has expanded and overlapped with
other generators, utilities' ability to affect prices with changes in output (i.e.
market power) has diminished.
Order 888 arose from FERC's duty to protect wholesalers against undu-
ly discriminatory transmission rates.57 The overarching goal, however, was to
promote competition between wholesale sellers of electricity. 8 In theory, the
lowest cost producers would win the oncoming price wars, thereby increasing
efficiency and reducing costs to consumers. A great many academics expressed
deep concern about the effect deregulation might have on the electric industry's
environmental performance. 59 Nonetheless, FERC stood by its assessment that
5 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmis-
sion Services by Public Util., FERC Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540 (May 10, 1996) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35, 385).
56 See MUCHOW & MOGEL, supra note 53, at §3.03.
57 Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (re-
fusing on ripeness grounds, to decide claim that Order 888 actually discriminated against trans-
mission owners).
ss Indeed the title of Order 888 illustrates this goal: "Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Services by Public Utilities." Transmission Access,
225 F.3d at 680 n.2.
s9 See Meredith L. Fowlie, Emissions Trading, Electricity Restructuring, and Investment in
Pollution Abatement, 100 AM. ECON. REv. 837, 842-43 (2010) (finding that deregulated coal
plants tend to disfavor pollution abatement investment because of uncertain cost recovery and
disproportionately negative credit-rating effects relative to regulated counterparts); Edan Roten-
berg, Energy Efficiency in Regulated and Deregulated Markets, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L & POL'Y
259, 271 (2006) ("In a market without adjustments for uncompensated environmental externali-
ties, the price of power can be expected to stay far below social cost. Consequently, many socially
desirable efficiency measures will not be performed."); Shi-Ling Hsu, Reducing Emission from
the Electricity Generation Industry: Can We Finally Do It?, 14 TuL. ENvTL. L.J. 427, 428 (2001)
("A market-driven energy environment will probably lower energy costs in the long run, but will
probably offer little or no incentives for electricity generation firms to reduce or eliminate emis-
sions. In particular, market conditions may push the renewable energy industries to the brink of
extinction."); David Mallery, Clean Energy and the Kyoto Protocol: Applying Environmental
Controls to Grandfathered Power Facilities, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVEL. L. & POL'Y 469, 471-77
(1999) ("Recent deregulation of the electric utility industry significantly favors [older coal-fired
power plants]"); Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Regu-
lation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 248 (1999) ("Deregulation
creates incentives to use cheaper, yet more polluting, coal . . . ."); William G. Rosenburg, Restruc-
turing the Electric Utility Industry and Its Effect on the Environment, 14 PACE ENYTL. L. REv. 69,
73 (1996) ("[T]he lowest-cost producers of power, by far, are the older, Midwest power plants that
have the fewest environmental controls. These plants ... will benefit from the greatest consumer
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"negative consequences are not likely to occur until after the turn of the [20th]
century" and that "impacts will remain modest at least until 2010;" therefore
"there is no need for an interim mitigation program." 60 FERC's environmental
analysis particularly concentrated on "possible increases in nitrogen oxides from
certain fossil fuel generators," though at the time mercury and carbon dioxide
emissions (C0 2) were completely unregulated and ozone regulation was far
looser than it is today.6' Furthermore, and more revealing of the agency's "pub-
lic interest" interpretation, even if the environmental consequences were great,
said FERC, "the Commission does not have the statutory authority under the
Federal Power Act ... to address this far-term problem." 6 2  Such a statement
illustrates a shift in environmental posture from much earlier in the agency's
history.63
FERC's authority over "just and reasonable" transmission pricing also
carries environmental significance.64 Order 888 and Order 2000 delegated most
transmission grid management responsibilities to independent system operators
(ISOs).65 During the rulemaking proceedings, FERC rejected a request to give
demand and will significantly increase production in turn increasing emissions. If a purely free
market selling price is the only issue, rather than utilizing clean burning nuclear or gas power or
building a new clean generator, customers across the country will favor the cheapest power (typi-
cally a coal-based generators).. . ."); Rudy Perkins, Electricity Deregulation, Environmental
Externalities and Limitations ofPrice, 39 B.C. L. REv. 993, 1055 (1998) ("Without environmental
adders, carbon emissions taxes or other penalties on CO 2 output, cost advantages for coal could
maintain or increase its use, thereby increasing global warming."); Justin M. Nesbit, Commerce
Clause Implications of Massachusetts'Attempt to Limit the Importation of "Dirty" Power in the
Looming Competitive Retail Market for Electricity Regulation, 38 B.C. L. REV. 811 (1997) (attri-
buting increased pollution to coal's ability to externalize a portion of its costs). But see David B.
Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market, 15 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
187 (2005) (citing many above-cited sources and suggesting that they exaggerate the effects of
electricity competition on environmental performance).
60 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmis-
sion Services by Public Utilities, FERC Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540, 21542 (May 10, 1996) (to
be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35, 385).
61 Id.; see David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market, 15 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 187, 207-10 (2005).
62 FERC Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21542.
63 Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 614 (1965) ("The
Commission has recognized generally that members of the public have rights in our recreational,
historic and scenic resources under the Federal Power Act."); Namekagon Hydro Co., 12 F.P.C.
203, 206 (1954), aff'd, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954) ("[T]he Commission realizes that in many
cases where unique and most special types of recreation are encountered a dollar evaluation is
inadequate as the public interest must be considered and it cannot be evaluated adequately only in
dollars and cents.").
64 16 U.S.C.A. § 824e(a) (2010).
65 See FERC Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg 21540; Reg'1 Transmission Org., FERC Order 2000, 65
Fed. Reg. 809 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). System operators are variously
called independent system operators (ISOs) or regional transmission organizations (RTOs). The
differences are insignificant for purposes of this article. See LoRRIN PHILIPSON & H. LEE WELLS,
UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND DE-REGULATION 320-21 (2d ed. 2006).
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66
ISOs specific direction on pricing. It instead directed each ISO to "administer
its own tariff and employ a transmission pricing system that will promote effi-
cient use and expansion of transmission and generation facilities," provided of
course that such tariffs are "just and reasonable." 68
ISOs usually post available transmission capacity schedules on an elec-
tronic bulletin board and bidding system.69 This schedule forecasts transmission
availability well into the future, and buyers reserve network capacity hours,
months, or years before the scheduled power generation occurs.7 0 Capacity re-
served with ample notice generally carries a lower price than short-notice reser-
vations. In contrast with fossil fuels, most clean energy generation technologies
produce on a highly variable schedule. Thus pricing schemes that have firm
take-or-pay reservation requirements-fees for capacity reserved regardless of
capacity actually used-may place clean energy at a competitive disadvantage
vis-A-vis fossil fuels.7 ' Distance-based pricing, based on the number of trans-
mission miles energy must travel, may also disadvantage clean energy.72 Wind,
biomass, geothermal, and solar-thermal sources of energy are often located far
from population centers, and involve high transmission costs relative to fossil
resources. 7 3
Some well-regarded alternative price methods could help restore a level
playing field for transmission users. One such method is locationally-based
pricing of transmission service.74 This method assigns costs based on the con-
gestion of each particular line throughout the day. This real-time congestion
pricing diminishes the advantage of early reservations because it dictates prices
in momentary, real-time markets. Furthermore, the issue of transmission dis-
tance, which disproportionately affects clean energy sources, is secondary to
transmission congestion. But ultimately, FERC leaves it to ISOs "to reform
66 FERC Order 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. at 876.
67 Id
68 Id. at 913.
69 Open Access Same-Time Info. Sys. (Formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and Stan-
dards of Conduct, FERC Order 889, 61 Fed. Reg. 21737 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.
37).
70 See Cambridge Elec. Light Co., FERC Op. No. 424, 84 F.E.R.C. 61049 (July 20, 1998)
(holding firm transmission tariff "just and reasonable"); PHILIPSON & WELLS, supra note 65, at
332-33.
7' Capacity-based transmission tariffs are also called "pro forna tariffs." PHILIPSON & WELLS,
supra note 65, at 343.
72 Id. at 343.
7 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TRANSMISSION PRICING ISSUES FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION
FROM RENEWABLE RESOURCES 9 (1999), available at
http://www.eia.gov/FTPROOT/features/transprc.pdf.
74 PHILIPSON & WELLS, supra note 65, at 345-50 (stating that the complexity of locationally-
based pricing of transmission service "seems justified to many, because [location-based pricing] is
a 'fairer,' or at least more consistent, pricing system that encourages reasonable and workable
buying, selling, and investment decisions by all involved parties").
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transmission pricing, and in return [FERC] propose[s] to allow [ISOs] greater
flexibility in designing pricing proposals."7 Despite the varying environmental
merits of transmission pricing schemes, therefore, FERC has essentially pre-
anointed ISO pricing policies with a "just and reasonable" blessing.
2. Interconnection Authority
When developers build energy projects, they must connect their project
with the transmission grid if they hope to move their electricity to major demand
centers. Grid operators must ensure the orderly interconnection of power sup-
plies to maintain reliability in the transmission networks. In practice, intercon-
nection amounts to a severe bottleneck in the development process and clean
energy developers feel the greatest squeeze. Of all interconnection requests
from generators to ISOs from 2000 to 2007, only 3% of the proposed capacity
had gone into service as of mid-2008.76 As illustrated in the figure below, the
ISO transmission interconnection queues have grown rapidly in recent years for





20,000 -- ___________ _______________
10,000 -
PJM MISO NYISO ISO-NE SPP WAPA BPA CAISO ERCOT
mTotal projects in queue at end of 2006 aTotal projects in queue at end of 2007
Figure: Capacity of Wind Projects in Interconnection Queues, 2006 & 2007. 7
7s Reg'1 Transmission Org., FERC Order 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 809, 914 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
76 NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., GENERATION INTERCONNECTION POLICIES AND WIND
POWER: A DIscussIoN OF ISSUES, PROBLEMS, AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 23 (Table 3) (2009),
available at http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/44508.pdf
7 Id. at 20. Note: ERCOT does not maintain a "queue," therefore, project-specific cumula-
tive data is not available; the 2006 ERCOT figure is an estimate of Exeter Associates, Inc.
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This barrier to market entry likely favors older established energy facili-
ties, and impedes the entry of newer competitive renewable technologies. It is
not insignificant, then, that FERC also delegated to ISOs "sole authority for the
evaluation and approval of all requests for transmission service including re-
quests for new interconnections." One commenter expressed concern about
ISOs' "authority to deny a generator that is not optimally located on the grid,"
(like clean energy generators) and another recoiled at ISOs' "autonomous, unila-
teral authority" regarding interconnection decisions.79 FERC shrugged.8 0 Three
years later, after recognizing that the interconnection process was characterized
by delays, lack of standardization, and competitive advantage to incumbent
utilities owning generation and transmission facilities-established fossil fuel-
based utilities-FERC issued a corrective order. 81 To reduce opportunities for
discrimination, Order 2003 established an optional standard interconnection
agreement and procedures.82 Yet again, however, FERC declined to consider
environmental costs and benefits a relevant factor in interconnection decisions,
and acknowledged that Order 2003 was based on the needs of large (typically
fossil-fuel) facilities83 and disadvantaged smaller generators. 84 Although FERC
has since developed technical interconnection standards for small power facili-
85 an8wnties and wind facilities, the environment has not gained a footing in intercon-
78 FERC Order 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. at 877.
7 Id. at 876.
80 Id. at 877. FERC said that those facilities that met a host of bureaucratic requirements,
including filing extensive paperwork by 1994 and beginning construction before 1999, could seek
an interconnection decision from FERC rather than the ISO. 16 U.S.C.A. § 796(17) (2010).
Obviously, this excluded all new and recently planned clean energy facilities.
81 Standardization of Large Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, FERC
Order 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 49846 (Aug. 19, 2003) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (facilities over 20
MW capacity); see generally NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., GENERATION INTERCONNECTION
POLICIES AND WIND POWER: A DIsCuSSION OF ISSUES, PROBLEMS, AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONs
(2009), available at http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/44508.pdf.
82 FERC Order 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 49846, 49919 (ISOs retain ability to propose alternatives
to FERC's suggested standards).
83 Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, FERC
Order 2006, 68 Fed. Reg. 49974, 49976 (July 24, 2003) ("[Order 2003] was originally intended to
develop standard generator interconnection procedures and a standard agreement for generators of
all sizes.").
8 FERC Order 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 49846, 49848-49849 (FERC agreed with small-scale ener-
gy advocates "that the use of [Order 2003] designed for Large Generators would unduly hinder
the development of Small Generators."); NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., supra note 81, at 13.
85 Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, FERC
Order 2006, 68 Fed. Reg. 49974 (July 24, 2003) (facilities under 20 MW capacity).
6 Interconnection for Wind Energy and Other Alternative Technologies, FERC Order 661,
Ill F.E.R.C. T 61,353 (June 2, 2005).
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nection decision-making, which remains a largely first-come, first-served sys-
tem."
FERC's deference to ISO tariff and interconnection practices represents,
in part, FERC's clean distinction between the environment and the "public in-
terest." FERC does not acknowledge the influence of environmental costs and
benefits on the "public interest" in transmission pricing and interconnection
policies.
B. State Public Utilities Commissions
1. Ratemaking
States retain authority to determine utilities' retail rates to customers.
Much like the Federal Power Act, most state public utilities commissions
(PUCs) 88 police rates on the "just and reasonable" standard with special atten-
tion to discrimination and service reliability.8 9  Since FERC's deregulatory re-
forms ceased with wholesale,90 most state PUCs continue to hold a tight regula-
tory grasp on the retail industry. This means that they determine electricity rates
through traditional rate cases. Even states with "deregulated" retail sectors de-
termine distribution rates-the price of transporting power to the consumer-
through traditional rate case proceedings.
87 Stephen M. Fisher, Reforming Interconnection Queue Management Under FERC Order No.
2003, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 117, 120-21, 139-40 (2009) (noting the widespread discontent with
Order No. 2003, and continued competitive disadvantage against renewable energy projects under
revisory efforts); NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., supra note 81, at 36, 38.
8 I use the term "public utilities commission" or PUC throughout this paper. Some jurisdic-
tions call this entity a "public service commission," "regulatory authority," "corporation commis-
sion," or other names. Furthermore, certain regulatory powers, like energy facility siting, may be
delegated to a particular energy siting board rather than the PUC in some states. I deliberately use
the term, "PUC" for all entities that exercise a traditional regulatory authority over electric utili-
ties, including siting and ratemaking.
89 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216B.16(5) (West 2010) ("If, after the hearing, the commission
finds the [proposed] rates to be unjust or unreasonable or discriminatory, the commission shall
determine the rates to be charged or applied by the utility in question and shall fix them by order
to be served upon the utility."); id. at § 216B.16(6) ("[I]n the exercise of its powers under this
chapter to determine the just and reasonable rates for public utilities, [the commission] shall give
due consideration to the public need for adequate, efficient and reasonable service and to the need
of the public utility for revenue sufficient to enable it to meet the cost of furnishing the ser-
vice. . . .").
9 Technically, the furthest reach of the reform was "unbundled" interstate transmission lines
that were owned by utilities who also engaged in retail sales. See Transmission Access Policy
Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (denying petitioner's claim that FERC
was required to extend Order 888 to all retail transmission).
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i. Prudence Review
One important tool in the traditional ratemaking process is prudence re-
view.91 PUCs scrutinize utilities' purchases such as research and development,
pollution abatement equipment, and wholesale power to ensure that consumers
only pay for those expenses that were incurred at least-cost and for which they
received a benefit.92
Retail electric utilities' most environmentally significant purchase is
wholesale power. Courts have created a caveat to the filed-rate doctrine, which
would bar PUCs from denying cost recovery of "imprudent" power purchases.93
The so-called Pike County exception allows PUCs to deny recovery of a power
purchase at FERC-approved rates, if the "imprudence" determination turns on a
factor other than the rate that was paid. 94 In Public Service Company of New
Hampshire v. Patch, the New Hampshire PUC denied recovery of a utility's
power purchase because "lower cost sources of energy" were available even
though the rate was deemed just and reasonable by FERC.9 5 The PUC's survey
of lower cost alternatives, however, did not consider externalized environmental
costs. The PUC actually used the exception to deny the utility's acquisition of
clean hydro power, arguing that lower prices could be obtained in fossil fuel-
leaning markets.96
The Massachusetts PUC, in Re Western Massachusetts Electric Compa-
ny, denied cost recovery for nuclear energy.97 The PUC demanded not just low-
er cost alternatives, but the "optimal supply alternative," which it found in this
case to be gas-fired power without consideration of environmental tradeoffs.98
91 See id; Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 (1989) ("Under the prudent in-
vestment rule, the utility is compensated for all prudent investments at their actual cost when
made (their 'historical' cost), irrespective of whether individual investments are deemed necessary
or beneficial in hindsight."); see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-1-1(d)(5) (2010) ("[P]ublic utilities should
have a reasonable opportunity to recover transitional costs associated with commitments prudently
incurred in the past pursuant to their legal obligations to provide reliable electric service at rea-
sonable costs.").
92 MUCHOW & MOGEL, supra note 53, at §2.07.
93 See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) ("Once FERC
sets such a rate [on wholesale customers], a state may not conclude in setting retail rates that the
FERC approved wholesale rates are unreasonable. A State must rather give effect to Congress'
desire to give the FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that the
States do not interfere with this authority.").
94 Pike County Light & Power v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 465 A.2d 735, 737-38 (Pa. Commw.
1983). Many courts recognize this exception. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of N. H. v. Patch, 167
F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1998); Ky. W. Va. Gas Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 837 F.2d 600, 609 (3d
Cir. 1988). FERC also recognizes this exception to the filed-rate doctrine. Palisades Generating
Co., 48 F.E.R.C. P61,144, 61,574, n.10 (1989).
9 Public Service Co. of N. H. v. Patch, 167 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1998).
96 Id. at 32.
9 Re W. Mass. Elec. Co., 80 P.U.R.4th 479 (Mass. 1986).
98 Id. at 538
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In Application of Northern States Power Co., an intervenor requested
that the Minnesota PUC deny cost-recovery of an "environmentally inappro-
priate" 800-megawatt (MW) coal-fired plant.99 But the PUC deemed the plant
prudent, pointing not to environmental costs, but to the plant's low price in the
absence of environmental harm.100 Focusing on the low price of coal energy,
the PUC concluded that "whatever the ultimate merits of [the intervenor's] envi-
ronmental concerns, it is clear that ... construction of [the coal plant] cannot be
characterized as inappropriate."' 0
In June 2010, the Kentucky PUC rejected a utility's proposed purchase
of 100 megawatts of wind power as failing the "just and reasonable" standard.10 2
Acknowledging "that 'least cost' is one of the fundamental principles utilized
when setting rates that are fair, just, and reasonable," 0 3 the PUC nonetheless
ignored environmental cost tradeoffs.1" A price difference of $9 per megawatt-
hour (MWh) between wind power and fossil power was enough evidence, said
the PUC, to deem the contract in violation of least-cost principles. 0 5
None of the PUCs mentioned above considered anything like the study
by the National Research Council concluding that coal energy would imply ad-
ditional climate-unrelated costs upwards of $120/MWh for coal sources, and
$10/MWh for natural gas. 06  Nor did they consider the U.S. Department of
Energy's (conservative)10 7 climate-related damage calculations, suggesting an
additional $32-$74/MWh for coal, and $16-$37/MWh for gas. 0 8
Rather than interpreting the "prudence" component of "just and reason-
able" rates to account for environmental externalities, these cases lend credence
to some scholars' fear that deregulation favors heavy polluters.' 09 In practice,
9 No. E-002/GR-87-670, 1988 WL 486179, at *9 (Minn. P.U.C. Aug. 23, 1988).
100 Id
101 Id
102 No. 2009-00545, Re Ky. Power Co., 2010 WL 2640998, at *3 (Ky. P.U.C. June 28, 2010).
103 Id. at *2.
104 Id. at *3.
105 Id
106 NAT'L REs. CoUNCIL, supra note 18, at 6-8.
107 Id. (estimating 1 ton of CO2 per coal-fired MWh and 0.5 ton of CO2 per gas-fired MWh).
Compare U.K. DEPT. OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 21 (at exchange rate of £1.00 =
$1.625, climate damages equal $83/MWh of coal), with U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 20, at
Appendix 15A (climate damages equal to $21/MWh coal).
108 See supra notes 15-19.
10 CREw & KLEINDORFER, supra note 34. FERC, however, remains steadfast in its deregulato-
ry policies. See Testimony of Jon Wellinghof, Chairman of FERC, Hearing Before the Energy
and Environment Subcommittee Of the Committee on Energy and Commerce United States House
of Representatives Oversight Hearing for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission March 23,
2010, available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20100323141517-Wellinghoff-3-23-
1 0.pdf ("[Deregulated] markets create opportunities for a wider range of resources to compete on
a level playing field with traditional generation resources. These less traditional resources include
not only renewable energy resources, but also demand response, energy efficiency, distributed
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PUCs frequently ignore or marginalize environmental impacts when evaluating
costs.
ii. Rate Design
In the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, the Supreme Court upheld a
Federal Power Commission (FPC) rate design intended to incentivize natural
gas exploration, reiterating FPC's freedom "to devise methods of regulation
capable of equitably reconciling diverse and conflicting interests .. . includ[ing]
the protection of future, as well as present consumer interests." 1t 0 PUCs, like
FERC, enjoy wide latitude to design the way utilities earn revenue.' Under
traditional cost-of-service rate design, where a rate is fixed only once every few
years, utility profits are coupled with volume of sales. If sales surpass fore-
casted demand, utilities enjoy greater profits. One common tactic to exploit the
promise of coupled rates is to sell electricity in "declining blocks." 1 l2 In a de-
clining block rate design, electricity prices decline with greater quantities of
consumption, thereby inducing greater consumption levels than would occur
with a flat marginal cost curve.' 13 Several PUCs recognized the negative effect
coupled profits and sales had on utilities' efficiency efforts. In 1979, the Cali-
fornia PUC instituted the nation's first decoupled rate design. 114 Rather than
earning revenue by promoting waste, utilities earned a fixed profit margin re-
generation, and other distributed energy resources. Where such resources are lower cost than
traditional generation resources, as is often the case, their use in our electric system can lower
total costs to consumers.").
110 Permian Basin Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767, 798 (1968); see also Fed. Power. Comm'n v.
Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) ("[T]he Commission was not bound to the use of
any single formula or combination of formulae in determining rates. Its rate-making function,
moreover, involves the making of 'pragmatic adjustments.' ... Under the statutory standard of
'just and reasonable' it is the result reached not the method employed which is controlling. It is
not the theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order
cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end.").
"' Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 313-14 (1989) (applying Permian Basin to
state PUCs).
112 See generally Edythe S. Miller, Rate Structure Reform: A Review of the Current Debate, 12
J. EcoN. IssuEs 609 (1978) (describing declining block rates and alternative rate designs).
"3 See Joseph A. Herriges & Kathleen Kuester King, Residential Demand for Electricity Under
Inverted Block Rates: Evidence From a Controlled Experiment, 12 J. Bus. & EcoN. STATS. 419,
426 (1994) (conducting electricity block-pricing experiment, and finding that low-income con-
sumers are less affected by block rate schemes, but "for higher income groups, [the last block
price] will dominate the marginal usage decisions."); Joseph V. Terza and W.P. Welch, Estimat-
ing Demand under Block Rates, 58 LAND EcoN. 181, 182-83 (1982).
114 RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER Loss: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN
THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 181-83 (1999).
756 [Vol. 113
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/6
RATIONAL ELECTRICITY REGULATION
gardless of sales volume.' This design enabled utilities to make financial
sense of conservation programs.
At the behest of state legislatures, many PUCs have followed FERC to-
ward market-based rates via deregulated electricity retail markets, but they have
met with variable success." 6 Market power remains a problem in many states
including Rhode Island, where only one investor-owned utility offers service
despite deregulatory efforts."' The goal of deregulation is to lower costs and
therefore prices, but at the height of retail deregulatory efforts in 2000, prices
actually rose for the first time in fifteen years."' 8 Near-term efficiency gains,
therefore, appear unlikely to eclipse marginal environmental losses due to dere-
gulatory incentives for lower priced-but more environmentally costly-fossil
energy.
Environmental consideration, however, is not completely foreign to
state regulation of "just and reasonable" rates. While ordering a transition to
deregulated competition, the Vermont PUC specifically required retail power
sellers to disclose all sources of electricity so that consumers could "make more
informed decisions about their power purchases, and. . . support environmental-
ly responsible electricity sources."" 9 The District of Columbia PUC gave a
positive, if somewhat poker-faced, response to the Washington Metro Area
Transit Authority's request to cap natural gas distribution prices to promote nat-
ural gas vehicles and pollution abatement.120 The Rhode Island PUC recently
disapproved a proposed power purchase agreement between an offshore wind
115 Jeremy Knee, An Environmental Role for Energy Regulators, 3 Nw. INTERDISC. L. REV. 104,
112-14 (2010).
116 In 2003, eighteen states were actively attempting to deregulate retail markets. ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, STATUS OF STATE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY
1 (2003), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chgstr/restructure.pdf. By May 2010, the
number of deregulating states shrunk to fifteen. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, STATUS
OF ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING BY STATE (2010), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure-elect.html.
" See generally John Kwoka et al., Divestiture Policy and Operating Efficiency in US. Elec-
tric Power Distribution, 38 J. REG. EcoN. 86, 87-88 (2010) (finding that state efforts to disaggre-
gate vertically-integrated utilities have large adverse effects on efficiency).
118 Paul L. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the United
States, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 31, 32-34 (James M. Griffin &
Steven L. Puller eds., 2005).
119 In re Restructuring of Elec. Util. Indus. in Vermont, 174 P.U.R.4th 409, 473 (Vt. P.S.B.
1996).
120 Re Washington Gas Light Co., Dist. of Columbia Div., 229 P.U.R.4th 177, 255-57 (D.C.
P.S.C. 2003) ("WMATA says that it is seeking to address the issue of air pollution on a regional
basis.... WMATA asks the Commission to at least restrain price increases on [the gas compa-
ny's] distribution rates for service to CNG facilities. Over the long term, WMATA urges the
Commission to take 'an explicit, regional, leadership role' in fostering CNG vehicle use. [DC
PUC explains that natural gas price will not increase for vehicles through the order without expli-
citly accepting or rejecting WMATA's call for environmental leadership].").
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farm and the local utility as unreasonably priced, 12' but only after judging the
price in light of avoided climate-related damages from CO 2 valued at $80/ton.12 2
Furthermore, most states encourage pollution abatement by allowing cost recov-
ery of reasonable abatement expenses,12 3 and some have explicitly declared pol-
lution abatement expenses to be in the "public interest." 2 4
2. Siting Standards
States also have jurisdiction over the siting of new electricity facilities,
including transmission and power generation. Construction and operation of
new transmission or generation facilities typically require certification from the
PUC that "the present or future public convenience and necessity" require the
new facilities12 5 or that the facilities would "serve the public interest." 2 6 Some
state legislatures have made clear to PUCs that the environmental impact is a
relevant factor in siting decisions,127 but many have not.12 8 The Clean Air Act
requires any new "major emitting facility" to acquire a permit from EPA prior to
construction certifying that the facility will not cause a violation of federal air
quality standards.12 9 EPA's environmental analysis helps PUCs sift through
environmentally destructive "major emitting facilities," but it leaves a large
number of "non-major emitting" transmission and generation facilities without
environmental cost-benefit balancing.' 30
State PUC interpretations vary with regard to the relevance of environ-
mental costs in siting decisions. The North Carolina legislature provides that a
certificate of "public convenience and necessity" for construction of a power
121 Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 280 P.U.R.4th 185, 212 (R.I. P.U.C.
2010).
122 Id
123 E.g., Application of Peoples Natural Gas Co., No. G-011/GR-92-132, 1993 WL 732432, at
*8 (Minn. P.U.C. 1993) ("[T]he Commission will not discourage [reasonable pollution abatement]
by being ambiguous about cost recovery.").
124 E.g., Re Tuscon Elec. Power Co., No. 59602, 1996 WL 551857, at *3 (Ariz. P.U.C. 1996).
125 TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-4-201(a) (2011) (stating standards for siting generation facilities).
126 Id. § 65-4-208(a) (stating standards for siting transmission facilities).
127 E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-98-2(3), (8) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-46.1(A) (2011). Ken-
tucky ambiguously directs the PUC to consider environmental costs and benefits, by ordering it to
account for facilities' impact on "scenic surroundings" and "property values." KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 278.7 10(1)(a) (2011). But the legislature pointedly reminds the Kentucky PUC that when
siting generation facilities it "may consider the policy of the General Assembly to foster and en-
courage use of Kentucky coal by electric utilities." Id. § 278.020(1).
128 E.g., ALA. CODE § 37-4-28 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-4-201(a) (2011).
129 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2006).
130 In relevant part, a "major emitting facility" is a new coal plant that emits 100 tons or more
of any air pollutant, or any other new plant that emits 250 tons or more of any air pollutant. 42
U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2006).
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facility shall be granted only if it is cost-effective and "in the public interest."' 31
These facilities are evaluated under the state's policy of providing "fair regula-
tion of public utilities in the interest of the public" and promoting "least-cost"
power and "harmony between public utilities, their users and the environ-
ment."1 3 2 In 2007, the PUC applied the statute to address reliability and power
price concerns, as distinct from environmental effects.' 33  In so applying the
statute, the PUC approved an 800-MW coal-fired plant without any analysis of
environmental costs.' 34 One commissioner passionately dissented from the de-
cision, pointing to the commission's duty to protect the "public interest" and
promote harmony between utilities and the environment:
We will fail in our legal responsibilities to the people of North
Carolina and in our moral responsibilities to our children and
grandchildren if we do not take bold, decisive action to address
the problem, not just deal with the symptoms.... But replacing,
megawatt for megawatt, coal-fired generation with coal-fired
generation, no matter how much cleaner the new generation,
continues to contribute to the problem.13 5
The following year, the North Carolina PUC reviewed a proposal for a
600-MW gas plant. It determined only that new gas plants "are more efficient
than previous designs, resulting in a smaller impact on the environment." 36
With that exploration of environmental impacts, the PUC issued the certifi-
cate.137
With even less statutory direction to consider the environment,' 3 how-
ever, the Illinois PUC espoused a very different interpretation. Like North Car-
olina, the Illinois PUC is not explicitly required to consider environmental costs
in facility siting. But in their analysis of the "least cost" means of satisfying
service needs, the PUC rigorously inquired into the details of environmental
externalities.13 9
131 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.1(e) (2010); see generally In re Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
257 P.U.R.4th 115, 121 (N.C. P.U.C. 2007) ("The standard of public convenience and necessity is
relative or elastic, rather than abstract or absolute, and the facts of each case must be consi-
dered.").
132 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-2(a)(5) (2010).
' See In re Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 257 P.U.R.4th at 121.
134 Id
13 Id. at 142 (Owens, Comm'r, dissenting).
136 Re Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc., No. E-2, Sub 916, 2008 WL 4616736, at *9 (N.C.
P.U.C. 2008). This includes the utility's integrated resources plan, which need not highlight any
information pertaining to environmental costs. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.1(c).
1" Re Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc, 2008 WL 4616736, at *12.
138 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-406(b) (2011).
139 In re Illinois Power Co., No. 06-0706, 2009 WL 3191528, at *3, 50-52 (Ill. P.U.C. 2009).
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3. Integrated Resource Planning
Some state PUCs require utilities to develop and implement integrated
resource plans. These plans incorporate least-cost supply-side planning and
demand-side management programs to reduce customer demand through con-
servation and shift consumption away from peak demand hours.1" PUCs often
rely on these plans in the process of siting determinations.141
The Massachusetts PUC valued externalities in utility resource planning
processes with numerical values assigned to various pollutants.14 2  In 1994,
however, the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down the externality values
as an excessive exercise of environmental policy.14 3 Other states, like Califor-
nia, have explicitly recognized the need to address environmental externalities
in planning the state's energy portfolio, though this innovation comes on the
heels of legislative mandate rather than an interpretation of existing "public in-
terest" mandates.'"
The Rhode Island PUC does not appear to require consideration of envi-
ronmental costs and benefits in least-cost power supply planning. 14 5 The Michi-
gan PUC requires a consideration of the regulatory costs likely to affect prices,
including environmental compliance costs, but the agency guidelines require no
accounting of anticipated environmental externalities over the 10-year plan.14 6
North Carolina requires such information as is necessary "to achieve maximum
14 Re Integrated Res. Mgmt. Practices, 116 P.U.R.4th 67, 70-71 (Mass. P.U.C. 1990) ("The
proceeding's purpose has been to establish a regulatory framework that will result in each electric
company's meeting its obligation to serve reliably and at the lowest possible cost.").
141 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.1(c).
142 Re Boston Edison Co., D.P.U. 90-270, 1991 WL 518157, at *20 (Mass. P.U.C. 1991);
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ELECTRICITY GENERATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL
EXTERNALITIES: CASE STUDIES vi (1995), ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/electricity/external.pdf.
143 Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 643 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Mass. 1994) ("[W]e con-
clude that the [PUC] is not authorized to take environmental considerations into account to the
degree it has. . . ."). This and other cases are further discussed infra at Part III.E.
'" CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701.1(a), (c) (West 2011) ("The Legislature finds and declares that,
in addition to other ratepayer protection objectives, a principal goal of electric and natural gas
utilities' resource planning and investment shall be to minimize the cost to society of . .. energy
... and to improve the environment .... (c) In calculating the cost effectiveness of energy re-
sources ... the commission shall include, in addition to other ratepayer protection objectives, a
value for any costs and benefits to the environment, including air quality.").
145 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-1-27.8 (2011). But the state's lone investor-owned utility voluntarily
adopted a system reliability plan that weighs the environmental benefits of particular technologies
added for grid reliability planning purposes. See National Grid Least Cost Procurement, No.
3931, 2009 WL 1145934 (R.I. P.U.C. 2009).
14 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 460.6S(11) (2011); To Implement the Provisions of MCL 460, No. U-
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efficiencies for the benefit of the people of North Carolina,"l 47 but such plans
may contribute little to environmentally considered decisions.14 8
C. "Public Interest" Principles: A Summary
The foregoing survey has panned out a handful of core meanings as-
signed to the "public interest." Those interpretive principles bear further distil-
lation.14 9 Economic theory regards the fundamental problem of public utilities
as taking advantage of economies of scale (e.g. preventing needless duplication
of power lines) while avoiding monopolistic excesses (e.g. preventing deliberate
reductions in output to inflate prices and profits). 50  Because markets fail to
deliver an efficient outcome, government should regulate.'' FERC and PUC
actions appear to recognize this "public interest" in social efficiency, for exam-
ple, by promoting competition in the absence of natural monopoly 52 and reduc-
ing transaction costs by exempting bilateral contracts from "just and reasonable"
review. 15 3 The paramount aim of efficiency measures, however, remains mini-
mizing costs to consumers.154 When markets are deemed unable to deliver min-
imum costs to consumers, many regulators allow recovery of only "prudent"
147 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.1(c).
148 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 131-37.
149 While nearly every controversy in law and policy can trace its roots to the epic tension
between efficiency and equity, those objectives provide little guidance on the actual considera-
tions regulators use to determine the "public interest." For this reason, I decipher regulators'
"public interest" objectives at a slightly higher level of specificity. The reader should nonetheless
intuit the efficiency-equity tension throughout "public interest" decision-making. Direct discus-
sion of efficiency-equity tradeoffs has not been overlooked. Rather, it has been deliberately
avoided.
Iso CREW & KLEINDORFER, supra note 34, at 3.
151 M. A. UTTON, THE EcONOMICS OF REGULATING INDUSTRY 13 (1986).
152 E.g., Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Trans-
mission Services by Public Utilities, Order 888, 61 FERC 21540 (May 10, 1996).
15 See Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 542, 551
(2008) (affirming and strengthening the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, which establishes a presumption
of "justice and reasonableness" for all contracted power rates, rebuttable upon showing that rates
and terms are contrary to the public interest).
154 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 354 (1956) ("That the purpose
of the power given the Commission by § 206 (a) is the protection of the public interest, as distin-
guished from the private interests of the utilities, is evidenced by the recital in § 201 of the [Fed-
eral Power Act] that the scheme of regulation imposed 'is necessary in the public interest."); see
Richard Cudahy, Conference: Harvard Electricity Policy Group: Regulatory Decisionmaking
Reform, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 789, 828 (1995) ("I think the fundamental problem [with deregula-
tion] is somehow to enable regulators to preserve their function as defenders of equity while al-
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expenditures and "least-cost" supply alternatives.155 Utility regulators seek to
minimize costs (and maximize benefits) to society or consumers or both.
The principle of nondiscrimination intertwines with "just and reasona-
ble," cost-minimizing rates.15 6 This principle is found in regulators' consumer
bias. Price discrimination-varying prices according to consumers' respective
marginal willingnesses-to-pay--could conceivably produce a superior result in
terms of social efficiency by shifting surplus to producers. 5 7 But PUCs and
courts have articulated a "right of consumers to pay a rate which accurately re-
flects the cost of service rendered"' 58 and consumer protection against "exces-
sive burden[s],"' 5 9 which includes competitive disadvantage resulting from simi-
larly situated customers bearing disproportionate costs.160 In most cases, cost
minimization and nondiscrimination are complementary. Nondiscrimination,
for example, justified FERC's open-access transmission policy, which in turn
accomplished competitive cost-reductions in the wholesale generation sector."'
Historically, however, nondiscrimination has often stood at odds with low con-
sumer costs, as during rural electrification.16 2
A third critical component of the "public interest" is adequacy of ser-
vice. 16 3 For this reason, the Supreme Court declared that, as a baseline, "[r]ates
'5s Re Kentucky Power Co., No. 2009-00545, 2010 WL 2640998, at *2 (Ky. P.S.C. 2010)
("The Commission has long recognized that 'least cost' is one of the fundamental principles uti-
lized when setting rates that are fair, just, and reasonable."); CREw & KLEINDORFER, supra note
34, at 28 ("[P]roducers may not be X-efficient if they are assured that all costs can be passed
through to the consumer."); see supra Part I.B.
156 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 278-79 (1976) ("The Commission
must arrive at a rate level deemed by it to be just and reasonable, but in doing so it must consider
the tendered allegations that the proposed rates are discriminatory . .. in effect.").
1 Utilities have historically engaged in "second-degree" price discrimination where prices
vary according to customers' volume of consumption, but other forms of price discrimination
could be possible and could deliver relatively efficient results. See CABRAL, supra note 43, at 167,
169, 173 (2000).
158 Pub. Serv. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 644 P.2d 933, 939 (Colo. 1982).
159 NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 693, 699 (2010) (quoting
Fed. Power Comm'n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956)).
160 id
161 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmis-
sion Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 FERC 21540 (May 10, 1996).
162 JIM Rossi, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW 78-79 (2005) (noting the economic
inefficiency of enhancing electricity and gas access for a few high-cost customers at the expense
of general ratepayers). Extension of service to high-cost customers follows the service adequacy
principle as much as the nondiscrimination principle of "public interest."
163 For purposes of this paper, I also lump safety into this category. Safety has little connection
to the environment, but it is usually recognized as a "public interest," often in tandem with service
adequacy. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAW § 65(1) (Consol. 2011) ("Every gas corporation, every
electric corporation and every municpality shall furnish and provide such service, instrumentali-
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which enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial inte-
grity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed
certainly cannot be condemned as [unjust and unreasonable]."'6 Importantly, it
is in the consumer's and investor's shared interest to maintain the continuity and
reliability of electricity service.' 65 The "public interest" comprises the quality of
electricity service rendered by utilities. 166
These related objectives-cost minimization, nondiscrimination, and
adequacy of service-form the common nucleus of the "public interest" as in-
terpreted by utility regulators.16 7  Sometimes conflicting, sometimes harmo-
nious, these goals bend and mix with the circumstances to realize the public's
aggregate interests. "Easier to sense than to define or instill," says one public
utility scholar, "the public interest is divined not through opinion polls or politi-
cal expediency but by the deliberative weighing of subordinate interests in the
context of a social compact to pursue a larger common good." 6 1 In Part II be-
low, I discuss where environmental consideration might fit within the traditional
"public interest" objectives, and what courts should do about it.
16 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944).
165 See id. at 603.
166 NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976) ("The use of the words 'public
interest' in the Gas and Power Acts is . .. a charge to promote the orderly production of plentiful
supplies of electric energy and natural gas at just and reasonable rates.").
167 James C. Bonbright summarizes utility rate regulation with nearly identical principles,
which he calls "consumer rationing" (my "cost minimization"), "fairness to ratepayers" (my
"nondiscrimination"), and "capital attraction" (my "adequacy of service"). JAMES C. BONBRIGHT
ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 385 (2d ed. 1988); see also Fed. Power Comm'n v.
Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 354-55 (1956) (presenting possible factors to test whether a
contract violates the "public interest" under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, including (1) impairing
financial ability of utility to render service, (2) casting an excessive burden on consumers, and (3)
causing undue discrimination); Testimony ofJon Wellinghof Chairman ofFERC, Hearing Before
the Energy and Environment Subcommittee Of the Committee on Energy and Commerce United
States House of Representatives Oversight Hearing for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion March 23, 2010, FERC (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.ferc.gov/eventCalendar/files/20100323141527-wellinghoff-3-23-10.pdf ("As stated in
our Strategic Plan, the Commission's mission is to assist consumers in obtaining reliable, effi-
cient, and sustainable energy services at a reasonable cost through appropriate regulatory and
market means. Fulfilling this mission involves two primary goals: (1) promoting the development
of safe, reliable and efficient energy infrastructure that serves the public interest; and (2) ensuring
that rates, terms and conditions for wholesale sales and transmission of electric energy and natural
gas in interstate commerce are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.
These goals are fundamental. They arise from the Commission's longstanding authorizing sta-
tutes, particularly the Federal Power Act .... ).
168 See Janice A. Beecher, The Prudent Regulator: Politics, Independence, Ethics, and the
Public Interest, 29 ENERGY L.J. 577, 578 (2008).
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II. PROTECTING THE "PUBLIC INTEREST": REASONABLE PROCESS
Utility regulators express their statutory interpretations in formal and in-
formal orders, rulemakings, and ratemakings. Courts treat these interpretations
with deference. And for good reason. Gaps in statutes are viewed as Congres-
sional delegations of authority to the agency to make policy through rules or
orders.16 9 Furthermore, agencies often apply technical expertise to decision-
making that courts do not possess.' 70 When ambiguity exists in a statute, courts
will defer to any "reasonable" agency interpretation.17' Likewise, when an
agency makes a factual finding (e.g. "least-cost alternative") in a formal pro-
ceeding, courts will defer to the agency's finding if supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole.172 Courts defer to factual findings that are not
"arbitrary [or] capricious" in informal proceedings.'
But judicial deference quickly dries up when judges sense that agency
decision-making outcomes are the product of flippant decision-making
processes. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) directs
courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law .. .. In Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,
Judge Leventhal described the implications of APA § 706:
[T]he agency has latitude not merely to find facts and make
judgments, but also to select the policies deemed in the public
interest. The function of the court is to assure that the agency
has given reasoned consideration to all the material facts and is-
sues. This calls for insistence that the agency articulate with
reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the sig-
nificance of the crucial facts ... . Its supervisory function calls
on the court to intervene ... if the court becomes aware, espe-
cially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has
169 Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) ("Judges are not
experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch.... [F]ederal judges-who have no
constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.")
170 Id.
171 Id. at 844.
172 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006) ("The reviewing court shall .. . (2) hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . (E) unsupported by substantial evi-
dence .... In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party. . . ."); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S.
359 (1998).
'7 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
'7 4 Id.
's 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has
not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.7 6
Assuming that utility regulators' interpretation of the "public inter-
est"-cost minimization, nondiscrimination, and service adequacy-is permiss-
ible, regulators must nonetheless take a "hard look at the salient problems" that
their actions present to the "public interest." 177
A. "Public Interest" as Cost Minimization
Environmental impacts present a "salient problem" to utility regulators'
efforts at minimizing costs. In economic terms, it is a problem of market exter-
nalities. Markets without externalities go something like this: each laundry
cycle costs me $2 in electricity and water. I will do laundry until my next wash
and dry cycle yields me only one clean sock. Having one additional clean sock
in my drawer is worth just less than $2 to me, so I give my appliances a rest and
ditch the sock till I soil some more clothing. I minimize my costs by consuming
electricity and water only when I sufficiently value another load ($2). All pow-
er consumption works more or less in the same way. I use energy until the costs
of using the last unit exceed the benefits. In economics-speak, consumers con-
sume until their private marginal costs of consumption equal their private mar-
ginal benefits.
Enter externalities. Suppose each time I use the washer, it leaks water
on the floor. I don't notice because it's a small amount and always hidden from
sight. After a short while, however, my downstairs neighbor discerns dark rings
encircling her chandelier. Now each wash and dry cycle costs me $2 in electric-
ity and water, and costs my neighbor $5 in ceiling damage-a $3 net loss. If my
neighbor makes me pay the water damage, then I will do laundry only when
clean clothing exceeds [$2 + $5 =] $7 in value to me (like for a hot date). If my
neighbor can't figure out where the damage is coming from, then I will continue
doing laundry whenever I value clean clothing at $2 or more. This means I do
176 Id. at 851; see also David S. Tatel, The Administrative Process and the Rule ofEnvironmen-
tal Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 5 (2010) ("[T]he purpose of this [hard look] requirement
relates to the rationale for an agency's very existence. Congress delegates authority to administra-
tive agencies not to authorize any decision at all, but to permit agencies to apply their expertise.
The [hard look] requirement allows courts to determine whether agencies have in fact acted on the
basis of that expertise.").
177 Id; see Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 313, 317-19 (1996) ("At a minimum, the 'arbitrary or
capricious' test prohibits decisionmaking processes that are starkly irrational, such as reliance on
astrology. At a maximum, it imposes a far more rigorous requirement of explanation. Whenever
an agency has legal discretion, the 'arbitrary or capricious' test requires the agency to exercise that
discretion rationally. Where such discretion involves an issue of policy significance, well settled
principles of administrative review typically impose a substantial duty of explanation on the agen-
cy." (emphasis added)). Environmental impact is one issue of "policy significance" present when
protecting the "public interest" in the electricity industry.
2011] 765
27
Knee: Rational Electricity Regulation: Environmental Impacts and the "P
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
more than the efficient quantity of laundry or invest less than the efficient
amount in washer repairs. 78
The lesson is this: it is virtually impossible to minimize total costs if a
substantial portion of costs are left out of the calculation. Without complete
information regarding costs, consumers will not minimize costs by limiting con-
sumption to those uses imbued with benefits greater than or equal to costs.
Much utility regulation is founded upon the public's interest in mini-
mizing costs: FERC's shift to deregulation was designed to "bring more effi-
cient, lower cost power to the Nation's electricity consumers;"1 79 regulated
ratemaking decisions aspire to an "accurate" reflection of the costs;'so siting
decisions often turn on questions of "least cost" alternatives;' 8 1 and so on. In
determining whether a particular rule or order will minimize costs, one must
perch the various costs and benefits on the balancing scale. In Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,182 the D.C. Circuit reviewed regulations
promulgated under the "general policy objectives" of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act to protect the public health.183 The court invalidated various
elements of the Secretary of Labor's benzene regulations because "the record,
examined closely in relation to the relevant concerns of the Act, leaves nagging
questions" as to why the Secretary allowed certain industries to delay com-
pliance with asbestos standards to protect the public health.184 Length of ben-
zene exposure was an obviously relevant concern to the public health, and deci-
sions regarding exposure required thoughtful explanation. Costs in utility regu-
lation appear to be precisely the kind of "relevant concern" that "nagged" the
Hodgson court in worker safety regulation. As length of exposure is relevant to
public health, so damage to public resources-like the environment-is relevant
to minimizing costs.
Nearly thirty years after Hodgson, the same court decided United States
Telecom Association v. F. C. C.'85 The court reviewed the Federal Communica-
178 Those inclined toward private contractual solutions might point to the Coase theorem out-
lined in Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). Given the right
conditions, the Coase theorem rejects regulation in favor of property rights transactions between
polluters and injured parties. Id. Mathematically, the parties arive at an efficient solution and
everyone is satisfied. Id. At least three critical conditions prevent an efficient solution, however,
in electricity-related pollution: (1) high transaction costs due to a diffused injured class, (2) ex-
traordinary market power possessed by most utilities, and (3) unclear property rights over clean
air. Id.
179 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmis-
sion Services by Public Utilities, Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540, 21541 (May 10, 1996).
180 E.g., Pub. Serv. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 644 P.2d 933, 939 (Colo. 1982).
181 Supra Part I1.B.2.
182 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
183 Id. at 470-71.
184 Id. at 488.
185 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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tion Commission's (FCC) efforts to minimize costs of certain law enforcement
features to telephone ratepayers.186 The court struck down the regulations due in
part to the FCC's acknowledgment that cost estimates "do not represent all car-
rier costs of implementing [the regulations]."' 87
In the same way, ignorance of environmental costs on electricity rate-
payers may preclude "a rational connection between the relevant facts found and
the choice made."' 88 To disregard or cursorily consider an entire category of
costs, in a statutory scheme intensely concerned with costs, would seem to vi-
olate the regulator's duty to construct for the reviewing court a clear and logical
path to the regulator's conclusion.' 89 Utility regulators may not simply assert
that an action minimizes costs, they must "cogently explain," with reference to
measurement methodology and data, how the action minimizes costs.'90 Such
an explanation would seem to require a good faith analysis of real costs to con-
sumers in the form of public health and productivity losses, climate change ef-
fects (positive and negative), and diminished ecosystem services9 ' and "non-
use" values.19 2 If one recognizes the legitimacy of environmental costs, then the
prevailing approach to determining cost minimization in regulatory action could
186 Id. at 461.
187 Id.
188 Id
189 Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("What
we are entitled to at all events is a careful identification by the Secretary .. . of the reasons why he
chooses to follow one course rather than another. Where that choice purports to be based on the
existence of certain determinable facts, the Secretary must . .. find those facts from the evidence
in the record. By the same token ... where no factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not
provide the answer, he should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found persua-
sive.").
190 U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 227 F.3d 450, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
("Fundamental principles of administrative law require that agency action be 'based on a consid-
eration of the relevant factors,"' and rest on reasoned decisionmaking in which 'the agency must
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ration-
al connection between the facts found and the choice made."' (internal citations omitted)).
191 The United States Department of Agriculture has articulated ecosystem services as includ-
ing "primary services" like nutrient cycling and soil formation; "provisioning services" like food,
fiber, and pharmaceuticals; "regulating services" like pollination, water and air purification, flood
and erosion prevention, and pest and disease regulation; and "cultural services" like recreation,
ecotourism, and aesthetic and religious values. COLLINS & LARRY, supra note 29, at 5; see Cos-
tanza et al., supra note 30, at 253-60 ($33 trillion valuation based on 1997 dollar); but see Bock-
stael et al., supra note 30, at 1384-89 (explaining that measures of global willingness-to-pay to
prevent complete loss of ecosystem services are specious and unrealistic as real world tradeoffs
occur at points between complete loss and complete preservation, and therefore marginal willing-
ness-to-pay is a more useful measure of eco-service value).
192 Nonuse value is the gain in a person's utility without actually "using" a good, like environ-
mental quality. This encompasses the "existence" value of knowing the good exists, "altruistic"
value of knowing someone else is enjoying the good, and "bequest" value of knowing that future
generations may enjoy the good. KOLSTAD, supra note 31, at 296.
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hardly be characterized as anything but "arbitrary [or] capricious." 93 While
economists embrace the legitimacy of environmental costs, reviewing courts-
quite unfortunately-generally do not. 194
B. "Public Interest" as Nondiscrimination
A similar duty of agency explanation exists for regulatory efforts pre-
mised on nondiscrimination. Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific
Power Co. opened the door to attacking rates that militate against the public
interest in nondiscrimination, as when rates to one consumer effectively "over-
burden" another.1 95 This statement likely has in mind the case where high prices
to one consumer class enable low prices to another consumer class. 196 But envi-
ronmental externalities identically create "an advantage to one at the expense of
the other." 9 7 Recall that where externalities are present, rates fail to reflect the
total costs of electricity. Customers across a service area may pay similar power
prices, but certain classes, like downwind customers, bear higher environmental
costs. Indeed, environmental externalities encourage higher than optimal energy
consumption among the group bearing a disproportionately low cost-further
exacerbating the disparity in costs and benefits. Thus, evenly distributed rates
fail to correct a discriminatory distribution of total costs and competitive advan-
tage. In law concerned with how rates might differentially burden consumers,
externalities are a problem.
193 16 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
194 See, e.g., Consumers Energy Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 367 F.3d 915, 922-23
(D.C. Cir. 2004) ("In competitive markets, 'FERC may rely upon market based prices in lieu of
cost-of-service regulation to assure a just and reasonable result."' (quoting Elizabethtown Gas Co.
v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 10 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). But environmental costs
may be recognized as "noneconomic." See Citizens for Allegan Cnty., Inc. v. Fed. Power
Comm'n, 414 F.2d 1125, 1130, 1133, (D.C. Cir. 1969) (affirming the FPC's finding that acquisi-
tion is the "in the public interest" in part because FPC required protection of the affected lake's
water level, conservation, and recreational use. "The FPC is not interested alone in economic
costs. It must consider other elements of the public interest, including specifically, here, the im-
pact on the recreational use of the lake.").
195 Fed. Power Comm'n v. Sierra Pac. Power, 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956).
196 Philadelphia Suburban Transp. Co. v. Penn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 281 A.2d 179, 184-85
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971) ("The requirement is merely that rates for one class of service shall not be
unreasonably prejudicial and disadvantageous to a patron in any other class of service. Before a
rate can be declared unduly preferential and therefore unlawful, it is essential that there be not
only an advantage to one, but a resulting injury to another. Such an injury may arise from collect-
ing from one more than a reasonable rate to him in order to make up for inadequate rates charged
to another, or because of a lower rate to one of the two patrons who are competitors in business.
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FERC's open access transmission policy is also premised on the nondi-
scrimination principle of "public interest." 98 Transmission owners were re-
quired to offer equivalent terms to all prospective customers.199 Deregulation
may, nonetheless, beget a different species of discrimination. Without consider-
ation of the variable and remote nature of environmentally benign energy
sources, discrimination against renewable energy sources may remain imbedded
in transmission pricing and interconnection policies. First-come, first-served
interconnection, for example, favors older established facilities,200 and distance-
based pricing formulas inflate prices for renewable energies.2 0 1 Open competi-
tion in wholesale generation markets-the product of FERC's nondiscriminato-
ry transmission policy-has been a lightning rod for criticism that it discrimi-
nates against cleaner fuels.202
These competitive advantages may prolong fossil fuel dominance by ig-
noring substantial environmental tradeoffs between fuel sources. One 1.5MW
wind turbine, for example, can displace approximately 3,000 tons of CO2 per
year, which is equivalent to planting approximately 1.5 square miles of forest
each year.203  That one turbine may avoid $63,000 in climate change-related
damages this year and $135,000 in the year 2050.204 Other estimates far exceed
those values.205 It may avoid an additional $473,040 per year in damages from
sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and particulate matter (PM). 2 06 By
198 See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Trans-
mission Services by Public Utilities, Order 888, 61 FERC 21540, 21541 (May 10, 1996) ("The
legal and policy cornerstone of these rules is to remedy undue discrimination in access to the
monopoly owned transmission wires that control whether and to whom electricity can be trans-
ported in interstate commerce.").
199 Id
zoo Supra Part I.A.2.
201 Supra Part I.A.1.
202 Supra note 43.
203 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, WIND POWER TODAY 2 (2009); see CHARLES KOMANOFF, WIND
POWER'S DISPLACEMENT OF FOSSIL FUELS 10 (2009), available at
http://www.komanoff.net/wind-power/WindPower's-DisplacementofFossilFuels.pdf ("The
amount of fossil fuels 'saved' or 'avoided' by the wind turbines may be estimated at around 90-
95% of the fuel that ordinarily would be required to generate the same amount of electricity at
fossil fuel generating plants in the absence of the wind turbines."); contra Kent Hawkins, Integrat-
ing Renewables: Have Policymakers Faced the Realities?, 18 USAEE DIALOGUE (2010) (chal-
lenging emission reduction benefits of wind power based on the use of simple-cycle gas plants
when wind is not blowing).
204 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 16.
205 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, 98 AM. EcoN. REv. 1 (2008) (climate
damage of carbon dioxide equals $85/ton); Frank Ackerman et al., Did the Stern Review Underes-
timate US. and Global Climate Damages?, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 2717, 2717 (2009) (climate damag-
es of emissions are dramatically higher than Stern's estimates); U.K. DEP'T OF ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 21.
206 Cost figure generated using $120/MWh damages from coal and a 30% capacity factor from
non-emitting renewable alternative. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 6.
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ignoring environmental costs in nondiscriminatory policies, utility regulators
perpetuate, rather than attenuate, discrimination between fuel sources and con-
sumers.
C. "Public Interest" as Adequate Service
Of the prevailing conceptions of "public interest," adequacy of service
may carry the least environmental significance. Environmental factors may
nonetheless substantially affect the quality of electricity service.
Thermal power plants produce roughly 85% of all electricity in United
StateS207 and consume more freshwater than all domestic users save the agricul-
tural sector.2 08 These plants must condense large quantities of steam into water
for cycling back to the central boiler. This condensation requires the extraction
of an enormous amount of heat energy via cooling water from nearby sources.
The heat, in turn, converts cooling water to gas that escapes into the atmos-
phere.2 0 9 The rate of water consumption varies among generating sources:
Plant and Cooling Sys- Water Withdrawal Water Consumption
tem Type (gal/MWh) (gal/MWh)
Fossil/biomass/waste- 20,000 to 50,000 -300
fueled steam, once-
through cooling
Fossil/biomass/waste- 300 to 600 300-480
fueled steam, pond cool-
ing
Fossil/biomass/waste- 500 to 600 -480
fueled steam, cooling
towers
Nuclear steam, once- 25,000 to 60,000 -400
through cooling
Nuclear steam, pond 500 to 1100 400-720
cooling
Nuclear steam, cooling 800 to 1100 -720
towers I
207 ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., WATER AND SUSTAINABILITY (VOLUME 3): U.S. WATER
CONSUMPTION FOR POWER PRODUCTION-THE NEXT HALF CENTURY vii (2002), available at
http://mydocs.epri.com/docs/public/000000000001006786.pdf.
208 THOMAS J. FEELEY & MASSOOD RAMEZAN, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND
WATER: EMERGING ISSUES AND R&D NEEDS 2 (2003), available at
http://www.net/.doe.gov/technologies/coalpoer/ewr/pubs/WEFpaperfinalheader 1.pdf (Electricity
production accounted for 39% of all freshwater withdrawals in the nation-more than 97 billion
gallons per day).
209 ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 207, at vii.
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Natural gas/oil com- -230 -180
bined-cycle, cooling
towers
Natural gas/oil com- -0 -0
bined-cycle, dry cooling
Coal/petroleum resi- -380 -200
duum-fueled combined-
cycle, cooling towers
Table: Cooling Water Withdrawal and Consumption (Evaporation to the At-
mosphere) Rates for Common Thermal Power Plant and Cooling System
TypeS210
Benjamin and Kelly Sovacool recently outlined the potential impacts of
thermal power plants on freshwater supplies and the reciprocal effects freshwa-
ter supplies may have on power production.2 11 Their generation and water con-
sumption models predict that twenty-two major American metropolitan areas
will experience severe water shortages by 2025.212 Water shortages may cause
generators to reduce output or shut down entirely, thereby spiking electricity
prices and causing reliability problems in the grid.2 13
Another risk to service adequacy is regulatory intervention. Water
shortages may encourage waves of strict regulation under Clean Water Act sec-
tion 316(b), for example, which directs the EPA to prescribe technology stan-
dards for location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake
structures.2 14 The EPA has made active use of this provision in recent years.215
210 Id. at viii.
211 Benjamin K. Sovacool & Kelly E. Sovacool, Preventing National Electricity Water-Crisis
Areas in the United States, 34 COLUM J. ENvTL. L. 333, 335 (2009).
212 Id. at 362.
213 See id; Anton Caputo & Asher Price, Water Helps Fuel the Debate on the STP, SAN
ANTONIo EXPRESS-NEWS, at I A (Sept. 13, 2009) ("If a water shortage were to occur, the [nuclear]
plant's operators would be forced to choose between potentially expensive backup plans to supply
water, or simply cut down the plant's output, probably at a time when the area needs the power the
most."); John Norton, Water at Pueblo, Colo., Power Plant Slows to Trickle, PUEBLO
CHIEFTAIN, at 9 (Aug. 29, 2002) (29 megawatt plant shut down because of water shortage).
214 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).
215 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: Regulations Addressing Cooling Water
Intake Structures for New Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 65256 (Dec. 18, 2001) (codified in scattered
sections of 40 CFR) (stricter standards for new facilities); National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System-Final Regulations To Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures
at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 41576 (July 9, 2004) (stricter standards for existing
facilities); National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Establishing Requirements for Cool-
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Inattention to environmental performance could suddenly cast doubt on the via-
bility of improvidently planned generation facilities.
Finally, climate change might have enormous effects on energy choices.
A recent government report expressed deep concern about the climate's impact
on power supply and use.216 Among other effects, climate change will increase
demand for electricity beyond the normal upward trend. t Many studies concur
that electricity capacity must grow an additional 14-23% relative to growth
needs absent climate change, entailing an additional $200-$300 billion (1990
dollars) in capital expenditures.218 Changes in precipitation patterns may affect
the output of hydropower,2 19 put more cost pressure on thermal power plants,
and create shortfalls in coal inventories as barge shipment becomes impractic-
al.2 20 Extreme weather events could cause acute disruption in transmission and
generation service, especially since a number of operational power plants are
sited at elevations of three feet or less.221 In 2005, for example, extreme weather
caused $15 billion in direct losses to the energy industry.2 22 Furthermore, rai-
Iroads-which transport 2/3 of coal used for power generation-follow closely
along riverbeds, and are susceptible to increased occurrence of rainstorms. 223
Temperature increases could decrease overall thermoelectric power generation
efficiencies. Given the dominance of thermal power generation in the United
States, a 1% drop in efficiency due to temperature increase could cause a 25-
million-MW loss in supply. 2 24 Indirect effects may include increased political
ing Water Intake Structures at Phase III Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 35006 (June 16, 2006) (stricter
standards for small facilities).
216 U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON ENERGY
PRODUCTION AND USE IN THE UNITED STATES (2008) [hereinafter U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE] (report
commissioned by Congress in § 515 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act
for Fiscal Year 2001), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-5/final-
report/sap4-5-final-all.pdf.
217 Id. at 20.
218 Id. at 12 (citing K.P. LINDER & M.R. INGLIS, THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE
ON ELECTRIC UTILITIES (1989)) ("The Linder-Inglis results are similar to electricity findings in
most of the studies that followed.").
219 Id. at 40-41 (citing B.A. MILLER & W.G. BROCK, SENSfvrfY OF THE TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY RESERVOIR SYSTEM TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (1988); Dennis P. Lettenmaier et
al., Water Resources Implications of Global Warming, 43 CLIMATE CHANGE 537 (1999); Tim
Barnett et al., The Effects of Climate Change on Water Resources in the West: Introduction and
Overview, 62 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1 (2004)).
220 Id. at 32-34.
221 Id. at 35.
222 U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 215, at 38 (citing MARKETWATCH, WALL ST. J.,
http://www.marketwatch.com (2006)).
223 Id at 38.
224 Id. at 30 (citing CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, CEC-500-2006-034, COST AND VALUE OF WATER
USE AT COMBINED CYCLE POWER PLANTS (2006)).
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pressure and regulatory risk for polluting sources.2 25 Regulators should engage
these questions, both in terms of mitigating climate change and adapting to the
effects of climate change on electricity service.
III. EXCEPTIONS TO AN ENVIRONMENTAL "HARD LOOK"
In the face of potentially significant environmental impacts, FERC is-
sued Order 888. FERC justified its action in part by disclaiming statutory au-
thority to address the environmental implications of its action.226 Part II's ex-
amination of the foundational "public interest" principles, however, suggests
that rational decision-making requires a "hard look" at environmental costs and
benefits. But when might FERC's disclaimer make rational sense? A few cir-
cumstances could conceivably arise where utility regulators might be justified in
omitting relevant costs and benefits in fulfilling "public interest" duties to mi-
nimize costs, cure discrimination, and ensure adequate service.227
A. De Minimis Risks
When a risk is so small that its regulation would be trivial, courts may
interpret exceptions to clear statutory mandates. The court in Alabama Power
Co. v. Costle expressly endorsed de minimis exceptions to the Clean Air Act's
strict technology requirements for miniscule emissions of particular pollu-
tants.228 The court urged the Environmental Protection Agency to omit certain
emissions after balancing the administrative burden with the risk posed by the
pollutant. 22 9 That way, said the court, EPA can create a rational de minimis
exemption.2 30 But "[c]ategorical exemptions from the clear commands of a reg-
ulatory statute, though sometimes permitted, are not favored." 23 1 Likewise, util-
ity regulators may balance (1) the expected administrative burden of environ-
mental analysis with (2) the expected benefits of a given environmental action
(or inversely, the expected harm of ignoring impacts).
Prior to comparing administrative and environmental burdens, however,
regulators must first acquire and analyze the relevant environmental data. At
least a rough knowledge of environmental benefits and expected research costs
is prerequisite to a conclusion that those benefits are de minimis when compared
with administrative costs. If preliminary data indicates that the range of poten-
225 Id. at 50-53.
226 Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540, 21542 (May 10, 1996).
227 The structure of this Part derives largely from the CASS SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 211-
14 (2002).
228 636 F.2d 323, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1979), overruled on different grounds by Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 358.
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tial impacts is miniscule relative to the cost of obtaining further data, regulators
may be excused from further environmental analysis and consideration under
the de minimis exemption. Reliance on existing studies, like those mentioned
elsewhere in this article,232 could help ease the burden of preliminary research
and approximate environmental damages where original research is infeasible.
Similarly, environmental data collected pursuant to procedural statutes like the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) provide ready fodder for decision-
makers. In this sense, a "soft look" precedes, and confirms the need for, a "hard
look" at environmental impacts.
Recall that courts require a "'hard look' at the salient problems."23 3 If a
problem appears miniscule, then regulators need not consider it.2 34 But a look at
the kinds of problems considered salient by utility regulators suggests that the
environment, in most cases, is not de minimis. In a case before the Illinois Su-
preme Court, the Illinois PUC disallowed $5,233 in excess compensation from
three executives' salaries.235 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.236 The Indi-
ana PUC scrutinized and disallowed a utility's $3,500 charitable contribution
and a $450 advertising expense.237 The North Carolina PUC flatly denied an
assertion that a 0.48% increase in retail rates was de minimis.238 A point of con-
tention in a recent Illinois PUC transmission siting decision was the potential
disruption of scenic views from farm grain bins.239 Between the two routes, the
PUC chose the one that "polluted" the visual field from a single grain bin as
opposed to five grain bins.2 40 The frequency of farmers' visits to the bins, and
their propensities to gaze out at the landscape from the bins, went unmen-
tioned-though one can safely assume that the tradeoffs were miniscule. In the
context of health risks from benzene, the Supreme Court opined that a
1/1,000,000,000 chance of getting cancer from drinking a glass of water is de
minimis, but a 1/1000 chance is likely significant.2 4' If the environmental risk is
truly miniscule, courts should not overturn agency decisions, even when they
232 See supra notes 18-19, 26, 30, 327, and 330-31.
233 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (emphasis
added).
234 Or perhaps a cursory "soft" look is in order to establish that the issue is minor.
235 Du Page Util. Co. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 267 N.E.2d 662, 667-68 (Ill. 1971)
236 Id
237 2010 WL 1806474 (Ind. U.R.C. 2010).
23s Duck Energy Carolinas, LLC's Advance Notice of Power Purchasing Agreement, 2009 WL
904943, at *17, *30 (N.C.U.C. 2009).
239 See Ameren Ill. Transmission Co., 2010 WL 2647673 (Ill. C.C. 2010).
240 id
241 Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. API, 448 U.S. 607, 655 (1980). Cass Sunstein points out
that the Court failed to consider the at-risk population size and duration of exposure, which could
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fail to fully consider the risk in decision-making.242 No bright line guidance
exists for balancing expected environmental impacts with expected administra-
tive costs, but, as shown above, impacts typically cannot fit into the pin-sized
opening for de minimis exceptions.
B. Scientific Uncertainty
Utility regulators may hesitate to rely on evidence of environmental
costs when figures-as they often do-span a broad range of possibilities and
depend on a number of interconnected factors. 2 4 3 Estimates of damages from
greenhouse gases, for instance, vary dramatically. The United States Depart-
ment of Energy estimated the costs of CO2 at $21 per ton,2 " while its British
counterpart priced CO 2 at $83 per ton.
24 5 If the range of environmental damage
estimates is so broad that the threat may be termed "de minimis," then a utility
regulator may rationally believe that it's not worth considering. Both CO2 esti-
mates almost certainly exceed the virtually nonexistent risks demanded for de
minimis classification, but environmental risks in certain circumstances may
not.
The continual improvement of environmental accounting tools should
reduce uncertainty and encourage regulators to depend on quantified environ-
mental impacts. Nonetheless, courts should require regulators to identify the
range of potential environmental costs and the probabilities attached to particu-
lar costs in the range. Some environmental data may be imprecise but it is still
germane to regulators' protection of the "public interest" and a rational deci-
sion-making process ought to consider it.
242 One objection to de minimis exceptions is that they don't matter in terms of environmental
impacts. Tiny risks will not likely affect the environmental quality of decision-making outcomes,
whether or not they are considered. In terms of judicial review of the decision-making process,
however, de minimis exemptions do matter. A recognized de minimis concept could mean the
difference between "arbitrary or capricious" and rational agency decisions. Furthermore, the
concept enables agencies, and thus taxpayers, to save on administrative costs, if the impacts are
comparatively tiny.
243 See, e.g., Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.2d 1029, 1032 (Mass. 1994) (In
striking PUC's environmental externality calculations, court noted "[i]t is important to recognize
that the range of considerations that the department treats as appropriate in valuing damage from
pollution emissions is wide . ... Certain of these damages are not measurable easily, if at all, in
dollars and cents.").
244 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 20.
245 U.K. DEP'T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 21. For a summary of the debate
surrounding climate damage valuation, see Richard Tol, The Economic Effects of Climate Change,
23 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 29 (2009).
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C. Accounting for Environmental Costs Elsewhere
1. Cost Minimization Principle
Rational utility regulation avoids double-counting costs. When firms
bear the costs of their actions, incentives to minimize the costly activity leave
society better-off. If firms bear more than the costs of their activity, they may
reduce their activity too much, thereby leaving society less well-off. Consider
sulfur dioxide regulation. In 1990, Congress created a sulfur dioxide (SO2)
emissions trading program that helps utilities internalize the costs of environ-
mental damage from SO 2 24 6 Assuming the emissions "cap" is set at the optimal
level-with costs of reductions approximating the costs to society of not reduc-
ing emissions-emissions permits should stimulate permit prices approximating
the social costs of the using the permit. Utilities will maximize profits by cut-
ting back emissions in the cheapest possible way, meaning that they will minim-
ize the sum of permit price and control costs. 2 4 7 So if reducing emissions-by
reducing output, switching fuels, or adopting abatement technology-is cheaper
than buying emission permits, the additional polluting activity is socially ineffi-
cient. Because of the cap-and-trade program, the additional polluting activity is
also privately inefficient for the utility. High value polluting activity will con-
tinue, while low value polluting gets the axe. Costs are minimized; benefits
maximized.24 8
Now consider a zealous PUC observing the damage from the remaining
SO2 emissions. It decides to make the utility "internalize" its environmental
costs even further by denying recovery of its purchased power proportionate to
the damage caused by the residual emissions. In terms of cost-minimization,
this is folly. Assuming SO2 trading markets are functioning properly,
249 the
level of emissions is already optimal. The PUC's meddling double-counts the
social costs of SO2 and leads to inefficiently low levels of pollution. This was
the focus of a Massachusetts Supreme Court case that invalidated the PUC's
double-counting. 250 The PUC required utilities to factor PUC-calculated exter-
nality values into their integrated resource planning.251 The court frowned on the
PUC's attempts to internalize costs that, according to the court, were already
246 42 U.S.C. § 765 1b (2006).
247 Tom H. Tietenburg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, in EcoNOMICS OF
THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS 279, 285 (Robert N. Stavins, ed., 2005).
248 The SO 2 cap-and-trade program serves as a model for most CO2 cap-and-trade programs
proposed in Congress. This analysis, therefore, would apply equally to CO2 cap-and-trade, were it
ever to become law.
249 Real world market mechanisms diverge from theory. Transaction costs for example may
inhibit efficient trading as when bilateral trading is disallowed or the permit market comprises a
small number of firms. See Tietenberg, supra note 247, at 285-87.
250 Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1994).
251 Id. at 1030.
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priced via federal environmental regulation.2 52 California has explicitly ad-
dressed this issue by prohibiting an assignment of environmental costs to emis-
sions that occur under a tradable permit or emissions tax system.253 The exemp-
tion policy follows California's recognition that "the alternative protocol for
dealing with the pollutant operates to internalize its cost for the purpose of plan-
ning for and acquiring new generating resources."25 4
But cost-minimizing incentives are not aligned, competitive discrimina-
tion is not adequately policed, and reliable service is not ensured by most regu-
lation occurring under major environmental statutes. One reason for this is the
lack of market-based environmental regulation. 25 5 Under market-based systems,
such as cap-and-trade or emission taxes, all the incentives are in place for utili-
ties to minimize total costs, including environmental externalities. 25 6 Under
command-and-control, the dominant approach of the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act, regulators act on incomplete information regarding pollution control
possibilities.2 57 They determine appropriate control technologies and direct
firms to reduce emissions in amounts enabled by the selected technologies. Un-
fortunately, pollution control costs are inefficient unless regulators select the
optimal techniques, technologies, and targets virtually by accident. Economist
Tom Tietenburg summarizes the problem:
The [pollution] control authorities' desire to allocate the respon-
sibility for control cost-effectively is inevitably frustrated by a
lack of information sufficient to achieve this objective. Eco-
nomic incentive approaches create a system of incentives in
which those who have the best knowledge about control oppor-
tunities, the environmental managers for the industries, are en-
couraged to use that knowledge to achieve environmental objec-
tives at minimum cost.258
Incentives to comply with command-and-control regulation should not
be mistaken for incentives to abate pollution or efficiently minimize environ-
mental costs. The utility pays for pollution control (e.g. technology installation)
but not the residual damage from emissions once required controls are in place.
Command-and-control, therefore, may implicitly subsidize utilities as electricity
252 Id. at 1032 n.4.
253 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701.1(d) (2010).
254 Id. § 701.1(d)(2)
255 Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Poli-
cy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 313, 317 n.24 (1998) (noting the tradable permit systems to phase
down lead in gasoline, chlorofluorocarbons, and sulfur dioxide).
256 See id.; see infra Part II.A.
257 Tietenburg, supra note 247, at 281, 285.
258 Id. at 285.
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prices reflect initial control costs but neglect residual environmental costs.259
Furthermore, once a utility installs the required technology-which may be sub-
optimal for the particular facility-incentives to minimize pollution through
operational techniques evaporate. Technology requirements increase up-front
costs but leave marginal private costs unaffected. Once the abatement device is
installed, additional emissions cost nothing to the firm. Switching to cleaner
fuels, for instance, has little advantage if a utility has already cleared regulators'
technology hurdle. Consequently, utilities may select dirtier, but lower marginal
cost, power facilities to meet base-load demand. Furthermore, command-and-
control environmental regulation tends to ossify abatement technologies and
techniques.260 Utilities operating with "approved" technology and management
techniques have little reason to invest time and dollars pioneering new methods
and devices. Indeed, the electricity industry's historically paltry research and
development efforts appear to be declining further as utility regulators move
toward deregulation.2 61 This stagnating effect may significantly alter the trajec-
tory of future social costs associated with greenhouse gases and other pollu-
tants262 and compromise regulators' duties to future consumer interests.263
While command-and-control environmental regulations inflict arbitrary
costs on polluters and reduce emissions, they do so without creating any mea-
ningful internalization of environmental costs whereby utilities optimize envi-
ronmental costs and benefits. The cost-minimization principle may require ad-
ditional effort from utility regulators, especially where existing regulations
make little pretense toward balancing environmental costs and benefits. 26
259 KOLSTAD, supra note 31, at 142-43.
260 Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and Environmental Poli-
cy, 54 ECOLOGICAL EcoN. 164, 171 (2005); see generally Adam B. Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins,
Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments
on Technology Difusion, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 43 (1995).
261 Tooraj Jamasb & Michael Pollitt, Liberalisation and R&D in Network Industries: The Case
of the Electricity Industry, 37 RESEARCH POL'Y 995, 998 (2008) ("The energy industry has gener-
ally been among the least R&D-intensive industries. However, the liberalisation of the sector has
led to further decline in R&D efforts within the sector.").
262 Carlo Carraro et al., Endogenous Technological Change and in Environmental Macroeco-
nomics, 25 RES. & ENERGY EcoN. 1, 2 (2003).
263 Permian Basin Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 798 (1968) ("The Commission's responsibilities
include the protection of future, as well as present, consumer interests.").
264 Utility regulators should survey all feasible alternative methods of complimenting existing
regulation so as to minimize costs. Consideration must be given, for example, to annual fees
collected from utilities to fund state monitoring programs pursuant to the Clean Air Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 7661a (2006). This would prevent double-counting. An exemplary utility regulatory
effort is the United Kingdom's Office of Gas and Electricity Markets' requirement that utilities
allocate 0.5% of transmission and distribution revenues toward innovation programs. See
OFGEM, Electricity Distribution Price Control Review, Appendix: Further Details on the Incen-
tive Schemes for Distributed Generation, Innovation Funding and Registered Power Zones,
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For other utility actions, outside regulation may be thin or nonexistent,
rather than flawed. Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases come first to
mind. Thin regulation might also be exemplified by the Clean Air Act's pre-
construction review exemption of "minor" emitting facilities ejecting less than a
few hundred tons of any given air pollutant per year.265 Moreover, EPA must
set the Clean Air Act's national ambient air quality standards at levels "requisite
to protect the public health," 26 6 without any regard for costs-environmental or
compliance or otherwise. 267 Ensuring a particular level of public health has little
bearing on ensuring an efficient level of environmental costs, especially consi-
dering that damage to public health is only one component of utilities' externa-
lized costs. 26 8 In any case, environmental externalities require further effort to
achieve cost-minimization. To the extent damage from coal and gas extraction,
transmission and pipeline construction and operation, and power generation are
not reflected in prices, utility regulators have sundry opportunities-and the
duty-to improve efficiency and minimize costs. 2 69
2. Nondiscrimination Principle
Few remedial measures exist to cope with environmental discrimina-
tion, and utility regulators, therefore, have correspondingly few reasons to ig-
nore the distribution of environmental costs under the nondiscrimination prin-
ciple. Utility regulators are empowered to regulate nearly all facets of utility
business and therefore preempt consumer protection and antitrust statutes by
occupying their respective fields of concern. 270 Environmental justice advocates
265 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2006).
266 Id. § 7409(b)(1).
267 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 464 (2001) ("[E]conomic considera-
tions may play no part in the promulgation of ambient air quality standards under Section 109 of
the CAA." (citations omitted)).
268 See COLLINS & LARRY, supra note 29 (describing external effects on ecosystem services
including "primary services" like nutrient cycling and soil formation; "provisioning services" like
food, fiber, and pharmaceuticals; "regulating services" like pollination, water and air purification,
flood and erosion prevention, and pest and disease regulation; and "cultural services" like
recreation, ecotourism, and aesthetic and religious values); Costanza et al., supra note 30, at 253-
260 (valuing global ecosystem services at $33 trillion valuation based on 1997 dollar); NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 4 (monetizing S02, NOx, and PM, emissions externalities
based on impacts to human health, grain crop and timber yields, building materials, recreation,
and visibility of outdoor vistas); KOLSTAD, supra note 31, at 296 (describing "nonuse" values like
the "existence" value of knowing the good exists, "altruistic" value of knowing someone else is
enjoying the good, and "bequest" value of knowing that future generations may enjoy the good.).
269 See Jeremy Knee, An Environmental Role for Energy Regulators, 3 Nw. INTERDISC. L. REv.
104, 111-17 (2010) (describing a few opportunities for utility regulators to improve utilities'
environmental performance).
270 E.g., Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 384 F.3d 756, 761-62 (2004)
(holding claims under state consumer protection and antitrust laws barred by filed-rate doctrine,
field preemption, and conflict preemption).
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have alternative means, namely, Executive Order No. 12898, Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.271 For various reasons, however, these actions inadequately remedy lop-
sided distributions of environmental costs, especially in the context of utility
regulation.
In 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12898, which di-
rected each federal agency to "make achieving environmental justice part of its
mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high
and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and
activities on minority populations and low-income populations in the United
States."272 Many agencies developed environmental justice plans and incorpo-
273rated them into agency decisions. For instance, many agencies review dis-
criminatory environmental impacts in formal reviews pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).274 The Order however does not bind inde-
pendent agencies nor create a private right of action or standard for judicial re-
view,275 and FERC's sparse compliance record leaves much to be wanted.276
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might appear to give all private
persons a legal right of action against discrimination under any program or ac-
tivity covered by Title VI. 2 77 But it bans only "intentional" discrimination on
the "grounds of race, color, or national origin,"278 which does not cover dispa-
rate effects on other grounds. Even if one could prove intent to discriminate on
forbidden grounds,27 9 it appears that Title VI applies only to utilities receiving
federal funds.280
271 Jason Pinney, Note, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Environmental Jus-
tice: Do the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act Offer a Better Way?, 30
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 353, 371-72 (2003).
272 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
273 Pinney, supra note 271, at 372-73.
274 E.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Administration, National Environmental Policy Act
Implementing Orders, 69 Fed. Reg. 9680 at 9688-89 (March 1, 2004).
275 59 Fed. Reg. at 7632-33 ("This order is intended only to improve the internal management
of the executive branch and is not intended to, nor does it create any right, benefit, or trust respon-
sibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United
States, its agencies, its officers, or any person. This order shall not be construed to create any right
to judicial review involving the compliance or noncompliance of the United States, its agencies,
its officers, or any other person with this order.").
276 Pinney, supra note 271, at 381-83 (describing FERC's record of compliance with Executive
Order No. 12898).
277 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
278 Id.; see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding no private right of action
exists under § 602 for remedy of disparate impact without showing of intentional discrimination).
279 See Donna Gareis-Smith, Environmental Racism: The Failure of Equal Protection to Pro-
vide a Judicial Remedy and the Potential of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL.
L. & TECH. J. 57, 65-66 (1994) ("Minorities disproportionately affected by toxic waste facilities
will find it difficult to obtain a judicial remedy under ... the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment ... [proving discriminatory intent] is so onerous that equal protection is incap-
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Justice Holmes called the Equal Protection Clause "the usual last resort
of constitutional argument" 28'-a sentiment shared by environmental justice
advocates.282 No environmental justice claim has ever prevailed on equal pro-
283tection grounds,2 so it promises little relief from discriminatory distribution of
environmental costs.
In this context, utility regulators may have much to offer. In February
2009, the New York PUC directed an electric utility that serves parts of New
York City to file an integrated resource plan with special demand response initi-
atives in its service territory. The PUC required these initiatives to include pro-
grams to reduce operation and emissions of generating facilities located in dis-
proportionately polluted communities, especially those comprising low-income
or minority populations.284 The resulting initiative specifically targeted a 50-
MW reduction in output from gas turbines located in one of these so called "en-
vironmental justice" communities.285 Moreover, to protect five other environ-
mental justice communities within the utility's service area, the PUC prohibited
diesel-fired power generating units within one-half mile of existing generators
in those communities. 28 6 Forecasts of lower long-term utility costs and emis-
sions borne by ratepayers in these environmental justice communities formed
the centerpiece of the PUC's proceeding.2 87
3. Service Adequacy Principle
No agency outside of FERC and state PUCs appears to be tracking envi-
ronmental impacts vis-d-vis electricity service adequacy. The EPA's regulation
of power plant water intake could help conserve water supplies and prevent wa-
ter scarcity from rendering a thermal plant unviable, but electricity service im-
provement is merely corollary to "impingement of mortality for all life stages of
able of affording relief to those who may be victims of discrimination in the context of facility
siting.").
280 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) ("No person in the United States shall ... be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." (emphasis
added)); Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 38 (1983) ("[T]he statute was meant to cover only
those situations where federal funding is given to a non-federal entity which, in turn, provides
financial assistance to the ultimate beneficiary.").
281 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
282 Pinney, supra note 271, at 377 ("The Equal Protection Clause has become one of the most
disfavored theories for environmental justice advocates to employ in challenging discriminatory
actions."); Gareis-Smith, supra note 279, at 65-67 (describing the "failure of Equal Protection" to
remedy environmental discrimination).
283 Pinney, supra note 271, at 377.
284 Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Consider Demand Response Initiatives, 2009
WL 3722049, at *1 (N.Y.P.S.C. 2009).
285 Id. at *4 n.5.
286 Id at*10-11.
287 Id. at *1.
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fish and shellfish."288 And regulations like these could themselves threaten the
viability of PUC-approved facilities as they need not consider compliance
costs. 2 89 Moreover, threats from climate change and increased regulatory cost
are completely unregulated outside of utility regulation. Exogenous environ-
mental protections by, say, the EPA may help preserve electricity service by
accident; a "positive" externality of regulation. But accidental protection of
service quality is unbecoming of rational utility regulation, and regulators can-
not rely on the arbitrary effects of exogenous environmental regulation.
D. Functional Equivalence: NEPA & Environmental Mandates
Sometimes lawmakers legislatively create an environmental "public in-
terest." This usually takes the form of statutory direction to "consider" the envi-
ronment in decision-making processes. By creating a discrete environmental
decision-making "factor," however, lawmakers do little to ensure rational deci-
sion-making.
1. The National Environmental Policy Act
At the federal level, and mimicked in many states, the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires agencies to disclose the environmental
effects of their actions. NEPA requires all federal agencies to assemble a de-
tailed statement on the environmental impacts of any "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," including alterna-
tives to the action.2 9 0 The environmental statement becomes a part of the record
reviewable by courts.291 However, NEPA is a procedural statute; not a substan-
tive one.292 This means that despite procedural obligations to gather informa-
tion, agencies remain free to order decision-making priorities as they see fit.2 93
No matter how damning the data, agencies may ascribe negligible decision-
making weight to environmental impacts.
288 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1504 (2009) (quoting 40 C.F.R. §
125.94(b)(1), (2)); see 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).
289 See Riverkeeper, 129 S. Ct. at 1508 (holding that EPA may, but need not, consider com-
pliance costs when establishing water intake standards); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531
U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (the Clean Air Act "unambiguously bars cost considerations from the
NAAQS-setting process, and thus ends the matter for us as well as the EPA.").
290 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C), (E) (2006).
291 See id. § 4332(C).
292 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (NEPA imposes
upon agencies duties that are "essentially procedural. It is to insure a fully informed and well-
considered decision, not necessarily a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or of this Court
would have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency." (citations
omitted)).
293 Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228 n.2 (1980).
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In Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) declined citizens' requests to relo-
cate a planned low-income housing project.294 HUD refused to undertake the
"only minimal" relocation efforts despite acknowledging that the alternative site
would be environmentally superior and overcome "valid questions" about the
impacts of the chosen site. 29 5 The Second Circuit determined that HUD gave
insufficient decision-making weight to environmental findings made pursuant to
NEPA.296 The Supreme Court disagreed, reaffirming the wide latitude afforded
agencies to elevate certain considerations over others in the decision-making
process. 297 Nearly a decade later, the Court again affirmed that "[i]f the adverse
environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and eva-
luated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values
outweigh the environmental costs." 2 98
But even discretion regarding decision-making priorities is subject to
boundaries of rational decision-making. Complete disregard of environmental
impacts is probably "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion" under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 2 99 The Fifth and Second Circuits have acknowl-
edged that "it is our duty. . . to compel the decision-making to give serious
weight to environmental factors in making discretionary choices." 30 0 The re-
verse is likely true as well: agencies may not consider only environmental im-
pacts when other factors are relevant. The space between 0% and 100% deci-
sion-making weight, however, is essentially a matter of highly deferential agen-
cy discretion. 0 '
NEPA's weak influence on decision-makers has not gone unnoticed. In
the midst of transitioning its retail electricity markets, the Vermont PUC laid out
an environmental plan. One component of this plan was to urge Congress to
amend the Federal Power Act "to make it clear that FERC has both the authori-
ty and the responsibility to consider the environmental impacts of broad industry
294 Id. at 225-26.
295 Id. at 230 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
296 Id. at 227.
297 See id. at 227-28.
298 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); see also San Juan
Citizens' Alliance v. Salazar, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29804, at *34-35 (D. Colo. 2009) ("Once
environmental concerns are adequately identified and evaluated by the agency, NEPA places no
further constraint on agency actions. In other words, NEPA prohibits uninformed-rather than
unwise-agency action. Consistent with the courts' generally deferential review of agency action,
in reviewing the adequacy of a final environmental impact statement [(EIS), courts] merely ex-
amine whether there is a reasonable, good faith, objective presentation of the topics [NEPA] re-
quires an environmental impact statement to cover." (citations omitted)).
299 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
3 County of Suffolk v. Sec'y of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting Sierra
Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1975)).
301 SuNSTEIN, supra note 223, at 212-13.
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restructuring decisions."302 The lobbying plan, the PUC hoped, might breathe
life into NEPA's ambitious language,3 03 but NEPA's segregation of environ-
mental impacts from other factors continues to hinder courts' enforcement of
rational decision-making. 3 0 Agencies can bury environmental findings by mi-
nimizing their weight in the decision-making process.
Courts and agencies continue to treat the environment as a discrete
component rather than a fully integrated consideration. But in utility regulation,
countervailing factors are themselves infused with environmental significance.
Regulators are charged with shepherding the "public interest," and cannot ra-
tionally separate environmental impacts from established interests in cost-
minimization, nondiscrimination, and service adequacy.
2. Environmental "Consideration" Mandates
The same subtle abuses of discretion can arise when lawmakers impose
requirements to "consider" environmental impacts without specifying measure-
ment methods (e.g. economic quantification vs. intuitive valuation) or decision-
making weight inherent in the impacts.3 05 Some PUCs have used their discre-
tion to all but ignore environmental impacts.306 The North Carolina legislature
provides that a certificate of "public convenience and necessity" for construc-
tion of a power facility shall be granted only if it is cost-effective and "in the
302 Restructuring of Elec. Util. Indus. in Vt., 174 P.U.R.4th 409, 473 (Vt. P.S.B. 1996) (empha-
sis added).
303 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4332 (2006) ("Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and
administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter .. . to use all practicable
means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster
and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans."). Id. at §§ 4332, 4331(a).
3 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (2006) (All federal agencies must "identify and develop methods and
procedures ... which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values
may be given appropriate consideration in decision-making along with economic and technical
considerations.").
305 E.g. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 278.710 (LexisNexis 2010) ("[T]he board shall, by majority
vote, grant or deny a construction certificate, either in whole or in part, based upon the following
criteria:" (1) impact on scenic surroundings; (2) property values; (3) adjacent property; (4) sur-
rounding roads; (5) anticipated noise levels; (6) economic impact on the affected region and state;
(7) existence of other generation facilities; (8) local planning and zoning requirements; (9) poten-
tial impact on the electricity transmission system; (10) compliance with statutory setback require-
ments; (11) efficacy of proposed mitigation measures; and (12) history of environmental com-
pliance.). In addition, the Board may consider the policy of the General Assembly to encourage
the use of coal as a principal fuel for electricity generation. Id. § 278.020(1).
3 Contra Review of Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 280 P.U.R.4th 185, 212
(R.I.P.U.C. 2010) (considering avoidance of $80/ton carbon dioxide damages when determining
whether price from proposed renewable energy project is "commercially reasonable").
[Vol. 113784
46
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/6
RATIONAL ELECTRICITY REGULATION
public interest.', 30 7 Proposed facilities are evaluated under the state's policy of
"promot[ing] harmony between public utilities, their users and the environ-
ment."30 s In 2007, the PUC approved an 800-MW coal-fired plant without any
analysis of environmental costs. 3 09 One commissioner colorftlly dissented:
We will fail in our legal responsibilities to the people of North
Carolina and in our moral responsibilities to our children and
grandchildren if we do not take bold, decisive action to address
the [climate change] problem, not just deal with the symp-
toms.... But replacing megawatt for megawatt, coal-fired gen-
eration with coal-fired generation, no matter how much cleaner
310the new generation, continues to contribute to the problem.
The following year the North Carolina PUC reviewed a proposal for a
600-MW gas plant. It determined only that new gas plants "are more efficient
... than previous designs, resulting in a smaller impact on the environment."3 11
With that exploration of environmental impacts, the PUC issued the certifi-
cate.312
In 1986, Congress imposed one notable exception to FERC's environ-
mental discretion. The Electric Consumers Protection Act required FERC to
give "equal consideration to the purposes of energy conservation, the protection,
mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife . . . the protec-
tion of recreational opportunities, and the preservation of other aspects of envi-
ronmental quality" in hydroelectric licensing decisions.3 13 Such legislative di-
rection, however, remains exceptional.
Fifteen state PUCs have an obligation or a specific grant of authority to
consider environmental impacts. 3 14  Yet one might surmise that legislatures
etched this language with invisible ink. A recent study using multiple regres-
sion analysis found that environmental mandates on state PUCs had no impact
307 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.1(a), (e) (2010); see generally In re Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
257 P.U.R.4th 115, 121 (N.C.U.C. 2007) ("The standard of public convenience and necessity is
relative or elastic, rather than abstract or absolute, and the facts of each case must be consi-
dered.").
308 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-2(a)(5) (2010).
309 See Duke Energy, 257 P.U.R.4th at 121.
30 Id. at 27.
311 Application of Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. for Certificate of Public Convenience, 2008
WL 4616736, at *9 (N.C.U.C. 2008). This includes the utility's integrated resources plan, which
need not highlight any information pertaining to environmental costs. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-
110.1(c) (2010).
312 Application of Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc, 2008 WL 4616736, at *12 (N.C.U.C. 2008).
3 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2006) (emphasis added).
314 Michael Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties ofPublic Utility Commissions,
7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2 n.4 (2006).
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on aggregate percentage increases in CO2 emissions, and likewise no impact on
per capita emissions.31 s
An environment-infused "public interest" might invigorate hard look
judicial review, even in this discretionary setting. As with any discrete factor,
utility regulators may marginalize environmental impacts as they see fit. But
regulators may have a difficult time explaining themselves if courts recognize
that the overriding factors themselves contain inextricable links to the environ-
ment. If regulators elevate the cost-minimization principle, environment is a
critical component. If the nondiscrimination principle is dispositive, distribution
of environmental impacts is integral. If service quality is paramount, regulators
must address the non-de minimis possibilities of environmental feedbacks.
Integrating environmental accounting with other "public interests" res-
ists the fallacy that regulators can surgically remove the environment from a
convoluted, interdependent system of interests. Admittedly, this is a mostly
semantic construct. But its adoption would make for a more sensible and realis-
tic conception of the "public interest." A fully integrated-as opposed to dis-
crete-environmental "public interest" could do what NEPA and state require-
ments to "consider" environmental impacts fail to do: force utility regulators to
take a genuinely hard look at environmental costs and benefits.
E. Tenuous Connections to Statute
The statutes from which agencies derive their authority, often called
"organic" statutes, limit agencies' authority to act. It would seem odd indeed if
the Internal Revenue Service began policing taxpayers' dietary standards, or if
the Department of Agriculture scrutinized farmers' expressions of political
speech. But in 1972, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) petitioned FERC's predecessor, the Federal Power Commis-
sion (FPC), to draft a rule requiring utilities to adopt affirmative action pro-
grams and enable offended employees to file discrimination complaints with
FPC."' The FPC refused, and in 1976 the case went before the United States
Supreme Court. The NAACP argued that FPC's duty to ensure "just and rea-
sonable" rates and protect the "public interest" required it to regulate utilities'
employment practices.3 17 Rejecting the NAACP's argument, the Court asserted
that "[t]he use of the words 'public interest' in the Gas and Power Acts is not a
directive to the Commission to seek to eradicate discrimination, but, rather, is a
charge to promote the orderly production of plentiful supplies of electric energy
and natural gas at just and reasonable rates." 1 The purposes of the statutes
315 John A. Sautter, State Environmental Law and Carbon Emissions: Do Public Utility Com-
missions Use Environmental Statutes to Fight Global Warming?, 23 ELEC. J. 1, 11 (2010).
316 NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 664 (1976).
317 Id. at 666.
318 Id. at 670.
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constrained the FPC's authority.3 19  While disallowing consideration of em-
ployment discrimination per se, the Court urged FPC to regulate employment
discrimination insofar as it affects costs borne by ratepayers. 32 0
Any environmental action must bear upon the purposes of the statutes
from which utility regulators derive authority, namely the triune "public inter-
est" principles of cost minimization, nondiscrimination, and service adequacy.32 1
Suppose a utility purchases a private forest to fuel its biomass facility. It de-
cides to harvest trees using bombs rather than saws. The utility's forest man-
agement may damage the local ecosystem and spring water system, contaminate
the soil, and perhaps wreck the home of an endangered animal. Ratepayers,
however, would not bear the substantial environmental costs. Nor would there
be any perceivable effects on cost, distribution, or service quality. Rather, in
this hypothetical, the damage is fully internalized and reflected in property val-
ues. This hypothetical G.I.-Joe utility is stupid, but the "public interest" remains
unharmed. Utility regulators probably cannot intervene on the basis of envi-
ronmental harm alone. A statutory connection is needed.
Likewise, setting efficiency standards for new appliances, homes, and
buildings is most likely out-of-bounds. Although dishwasher engineering stan-
dards may affect electricity demand, which in turn may affect electricity prices,
the connection to utility business operations is tenuous. Utility regulators ulti-
mately regulate utilities-not consumers. 32 2
Furthermore, organic statutes may protect only the "public interest" of
the relevant "public." Coal markets, for example, may fail to reflect mining
injuries and deaths because taxpayers (who are not necessarily ratepayers) par-
tially compensate victims.323 Such circumstances involve real externalized cost,
but if mining accidents do not affect service or costs to rate-paying consumers in
any way, the problem may reside beyond utility regulators' "public interest"
authority.324 The externality may cause artificially low coal prices, thereby en-
couraging suboptimally high levels of consumption, but no more ratepayers are
injured than before-just non-rate-paying coal miners. Likewise, CO2 damage
319 Id. at 669-70 n.6 (noting an environmental "subsidiary purpose" to the Federal Power Act).
320 Id. at 667-68.
321 Id. at 670.
322 Utility regulators can, and do, direct utilities to establish demand-side management pro-
grams that provide consumers with various incentives for efficiency improvements, but regulation
ends with the utility's behavior. See supra Part I.B.3. The California legislature created the Cali-
fornia Energy Commission, in part, to set efficiency standards for appliances, because the Califor-
nia PUC lacked authority. RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER Loss 181 (1999).
323 By the end of 2008 the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund-which is (inadequately) funded
by an excise tax on coal-had run a debt to the U.S. Treasury of $10.4 billion. OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GovERNMENT: FY 2010, Appendix
783 (2010).
324 Lawsuits, supply delays, and other factors make it unlikely that extraction catastrophes
would have no effect on ratepayers. See NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 668 (1976) (noting the
possibility of litigation costs affecting ratepayers).
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calculations that account for climate-related damage to foreign nations may be
problematic since they value the interests of non-ratepayers. 32 5
If cost-minimizing incentives are correct, cost distribution has no dis-
criminatory effect, and service is adequate, then the utility regulator's job is
finished. But one should not overstate the limitations that this, and other excep-
tions, place on utility regulators' obligation to protect the "public interest." A
great many environmental costs slip between regulatory cracks leaving consum-
ers none-the-better for it.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT THIS REALLY MEANS
The inquisitive ancient Jewish lawyer might ask, "what is the 'public in-
terest,' anyway?"3 2 6 I would promptly hand him a copy of this article. Being a
time-conscious attorney, he'd skip from the Intro to the Conclusion and say,
"sure, but what does the environment have to do with 'minimizing costs' or
'curing discrimination' or 'ensuring adequate service,' and why does this even
matter?" Lacking the creative capacity to invent a parable, I'd urge him to read
just a few remaining paragraphs:
Insofar as environment is absent from considerations of cost, discrimi-
nation, and service adequacy, utility regulators tease the judiciary with "arbi-
trary or capricious" decision-making. Decisions based on minimizing costs for
consumers should account for externalized costs, like pollution and worker ill-
ness or death, in addition to costs reflected in the pricetag. Likewise, the effects
of pollution are not evenly distributed, and can involve tacit cost discrimination
between similarly situated consumers. Finally, the very reliability of electricity
service could be compromised by poorly considered utility regulation.
Practically, what would this mean? If the judiciary took the hard look
doctrine more seriously in PUC decisions-and PUCs responded-we would
witness a number of effects. First, electricity prices would increase and demand
would decrease as regulators seek to minimize aggregate social costs. Recog-
nizing the damage to public goods like air and water quality, PUCs would deny
more siting permit applications from heavy polluting plants and transmission
lines running through pristine land. For existing plants, PUCs might devise a
special "public benefits surcharge" to direct demand away from heavy polluting
sources (e.g. make them uneconomical as a base load generators) and pressure
utilities to shift investment to cleaner power supplies. Similarly, they might
assure utilities of generous cost-recovery for aggressive pollution abatement
measures, perhaps guaranteeing recovery for fixed abatement-cost/abatement-
quantity ratios defined for different pollutants (i.e. ratios set at the efficient lev-
el, equating abatement costs and avoided environmental costs). The corollary of
325 See, e.g., Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.2d 1029, 1032 (Mass. 1994) (cit-
ing consideration of out-of-state environmental impacts as a defect in PUC consideration of envi-
ronmental costs).
326 See supra note 1.
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demand reductions is emission reductions, the value of which would exceed the
price increase so long as regulators carefully weigh the costs and benefits in
siting and rate decisions. Kury and Harrington constructed a model of carbon
pricing in Florida revealing that for every $1 increase in emissions price (i.e. the
marginal damage to the environment per ton emissions), the price of electricity
would raise by 550 per MWh.327 At an emissions price of $45, significant de-
clines in emissions would occur, as natural gas replaces coal in the generator
dispatch order.328 Only modest reductions would occur below that price, how-
ever, as coal would likely replace petroleum and coke in the dispatch order.329
Although electricity demand is considered relatively price inelastic,3 30 research-
ers at the Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center determined that a carbon
price of $35/ton would stimulate a 10% reduction in emissions.3 31 Short-term
reductions would vary depending on the generation mix of the state, though
long-term reductions could be much more significant. 332
Second, a genuinely hard look at the "public interest" would lead to a
more equitable distribution of environmental costs. PUCs may strategically
diffuse the pollution distribution in the siting process. In the alternative, PUCs
may remedy inequities by using rate discounts or special efficiency program
benefits to compensate communities bearing a disproportionate pollution burden
(assuming those costs aren't yet compensated through a different route like, say,
private nuisance action).
Third, a deeper inquiry into service adequacy would discover long-term
threats to electricity reliability and quality. Consumers may notice little differ-
ence in the faithfulness of their light bulbs, as service will mostly endure the
nagging water shortages, reduced thermal efficiencies, steep demand increases,
political pressure, and fuel and electricity supply shocks. But they would cer-
tainly notice the increased costs of maintaining adequate service. Mitigating,
and learning to cope with, utilities' environmental impacts now, would help
circumvent substantial future investments in service reliability. Direct effects
might include increased research and development inputs, more water conscious
327 Theodore J. Kury & Julie Harrington, The Marginal Effects of the Price for Carbon Dio-
xide: Quantifying the Effect on the Market for Electric Generation in Florida, 23 ELEC. J. 73, 77
(2010).
328 Id. at 78.
329 Id ("We find that at relatively low emissions prices emissions levels decrease, but that coal
usage actually increases as fuel sources such as petroleum coke and fuel oil are displaced. Once
this initial reduction has been achieved, further increases in carbon prices may do little to decrease
emissions until a 'critical point' has been achieved, and coal can be displaced by natural gas.").
330 Kathleen Spees & Lester B. Lave, Demand Response and Electricity Market Efficiency, 20
ELEC. J. 69, 76 (2007) (reviewing studies suggesting elasticity ranges from -0.2 to -0.9, suggesting
that a 10% price increase leads to consumption decreases ranging from 2% to 9%).
331 Adam Newcomer et al., Short Run Effects of a Price on Carbon Dioxide Emissions from
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plant siting, and development of long-term energy planning (50-100 year plans,
as opposed to the typical 5-10 year plans).
Centuries of legal development have made the "public interest" concept
what it is today in utility regulation. To some, it may seem intuitively sensible
to recognize a discrete environmental component in the "public interest." The
law, however, is not always intuitive, and in the case of electricity regulation
"public interest" does not expressly include environmental protection. But the
existing "public interest" concept, which emphasizes cost minimization, nondi-
scrimination, and service adequacy, clearly implies some level of environmental
protection. As I have shown, these traditional "public interest" questions are
laden with environmental significance. Not only do "public interest" decisions
impact the environment, but the environment, in return, impacts the logic of
"public interest" decisions. Rational decision-making, therefore, must require a
hard look at environmental impacts to ensure a sensible "public interested" out-
come.
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